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Supervisory Responsibility for the Office of Legal 
Counsel 
AVIDAN Y. COVER* 
ABSTRACT 
In the wake of the notorious Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) torture memoranda, various reforms have been proposed to prevent future 
erroneous and poorly reasoned legal opinions on matters of the utmost national 
importance. The need for refonn is all the more pressing in a post-9/11 world in 
which the Executive Branch will continue to arrogate, often in secret, various 
national security-related powers. None of the proposals, however, addresses the 
supervismy role that Justice Depmtment and other Executive Branch lawyers 
play in the formation of OLC opinions. 
This Article argues that the failure to hold more senior government lawyers 
accountable for the ethical failures of their subordinates dooms the many 
laudable proposals aimed at protecting against flawed OLC legal advice. By 
letting higher-up lawyers off the hook, these proposals ignore the collective 
nature of OLC opinion writing. More ominous, the failure to hold supervisors 
responsible encourages senior public officials to disengage from difficult legal 
analyses, therefore depriving opinions of their judgment, expertise, and experi-
ence. Most importantly, these officials are better situated to withstand the 
pressure to approve Executive branch actions. 
This Article proposes a new professional rule of conduct and process that 
addresses the responsibilities of senior executive branch lawyers and supervising 
lawyers who work with OLC lawyers. The proposal will require a greater number 
of senior lawyers to review and sign off on OLC opinions and to correct 
deficiencies where they perceive them. Adhering to the proposal will increase 
oversight of the OLC, ensure greater accountability, and lead to better and more 
independent legal advice for the Executive Branch. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. My grateful thanks to Baber 
Azmy, Jonathan Entin, Cassandra Burke Robertson, Sharona Hoffman, Jacqueline Lipton, Jon Romberg, 
Michael Scharf, Glen Staszewski, and participants in the Michigan State University College of Law Junior 
Faculty Workshop for their helpful comments.© 2012, Avidan Y. Cover. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Matthew Lauer: Why is waterboarding legal, in your opinion? 
President George W. Bush: Because the lawyer said it was legal. 1 
[Vol. 25:269 
The disclosure of U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
memorar1da on the applicability of the federal anti-torture statute to CIA 
interrogation methods, which included the determination that waterboarding was 
legal, has .elicited numerous criticisms, government reports, and articles concern-
ing the soundness of the opinions themselves and the accountability of the 
principal authors.2 The interest has been generated, in part, by the controversial 
issues at the heart of the opinions, but also by the particular power of OLC, which 
may issue opinions that are binding and are effectively Executive Branch law and 
can remain secret from the public and from the other branches of government. 
Much attention has focused on the ethical breaches of the memoranda's authors 
Jolm Yoo and Jay Bybee.3 Additionally, former OLC attorneys have proposed 
guiding principles and OLC established best practices, as well as some structural 
changes to the Office, to ensure that opinions are written with greater objectivity 
and candor.4 Missing from the numerous critiques and proposals is a sufficiently 
1. NBC News Special: "Decision Points", (NBC television broadcast Nov. 8, 2010) (interview by Mattthew 
Lauer with former President George W. Bush) (transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40076644/ 
ns/politics-decision_pointsl). 
2. Memorandum from JayS. Bybee, AssistantAtt'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to White 
House Counsel Alberto S. Gonzales, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2340-2340A (August 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum], available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news. 
findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/ bybee80102mem.pdf; Memorandum from JayS. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't 
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Acting General Counsel John Rizzo of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (August 1, 2002) [hereinafter Classified Bybee Memorandum], 
available at http://dspace. wrlc.org /doc/bitstream/204ln0967/00355_02080 1_004display.pdf. 
3. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INvESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL 
COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S USE OF 
"ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES" ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 16 (JULY 29, 2009) (hereinafter OPR 
REPORT], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ OPRFinalReport090729.pdf; Memorandum from 
David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att'y Gen., to Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Re: Memorandum of Decision 
Regarding the Objections to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional 
Responsibility's Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues 
Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected 
Terrorists 2 (Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Margolis Memorandum], available at http:/!judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ 
pdf/DAGMargolisMemol00105.pdf. 
4. Walter E. Dellinger, Dawn Johnsen et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (2004) 
[hereinafter Guidelines], reprinted in Dawn E. Johnsen, Constitutional 'Niches': The Role of Institutional 
Context in Constitutional Low: Faithfully Executing the Lows: lntemal Legal Constraints of Executive Power, 
54 UCLA L. REv. 1559, app. 2 (2007); Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting AssistantAtt'y Gen., Office 
of Legal Counsel, to Att'ys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions (July 
16, 20 10) [hereinafter 2010 OLC Best Practices Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-
legal-advice-opinions.pdf (updating Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Att'ys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for OLC Opinions (May 16, 2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 OLC Best Practices Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov /olc!best-practices-
memo.pdf.). 
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rigorous consideration of the role of the authors' superiors in the crafting of the 
memoranda and what, if any, responsibility they bear, and, going forward, what 
rules of professional conduct should govern the supervisors of lawyers crafting 
legal opinions on the utmost sensitive issues confronting the Executive Branch. 
This Article argues that holding the opinion authors' supervisors responsible is 
vital to ensuring that the Department of Justice, and specifically OLC, provides 
independent legal advice to the President and the Executive Branch. The need for 
independent legal advice is more pronounced during a "Terror Presidency,"5 a 
period of crisis over which the Executive appears poised to preside indefinitely. 
Given the technological potential for catastrophic attacks, any President will 
continue to claim extensive powers for the foreseeable future. 6 OLC is therefore 
an ever more vital internal check, a crucial part of Executive process, which can 
ensure the legality of Executive actions and curb excesses. 
Without holding particular senior Executive branch lawyers and supervisors 
responsible for the actions of their OLC subordinates, however, OLC may serve 
more as rubber stamp than as a true legal advisor or check on the post-9/11 
Presidency. An emphasis on supervisory responsibility requires an expanded and 
more rigorous conception and regulation of supervisory lawyers, which must also 
buttress and reinforce a set of legal values in OLC. The prior focus on the 
individual authors of the opinions ignores the collective nature of legal work and 
the legal norms and ethics that are communicated within the process of authming 
legal opinions. Emphasizing the professional misconduct of individual lawyers, 
without looking at superiors' roles, may lead to scapegoating individual lawyers 
and obfuscating what is in fact a deficient ethical infrastructure of the office. 
Additionally, proposed institutional infrastructural changes may not prevent 
similarly poor legal opinions in the future because they fail to sufficiently clarify 
the normative foundations of the Office. 
This Article proposes a more expansive formulation of the Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 5.1, concerning supervisory responsibility, specific to 
OLC. The current version of Rule 5.1 provides that law firm partners and lawyers 
with similar managerial authority must take steps to ensure compliance with the 
Model Rules.7 The Rule also imposes similar obligations on direct supervisors.8 
Supervising lawyers may be held responsible for their subordinates' professional 
misconduct if they order the conduct, know of the misconduct and ratify it, or fail 
to takes steps to mitigate the consequences of the misconduct.9 The current rule 
5. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
183-84 (2007). 
6. !d. 
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 {a) (2010) [hereimifter MODEL RULES]. 
8. MODELRULESR.5.l(b). 
9. MODEL RULES R. 5.1 (c)(!), {2). 
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does not, however, require sufficient oversight on the part of supervisors for an 
office such as OLC, where the work touches on ethically fraught issues of the 
highest national importance. 
The new iteration of Rule 5.1 institutes a number of structural changes to OLC 
that are intended to safeguard independent legal advice, including a two-year 
limitation on the tenure of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of OLC; a 
requirement that the Attorney General sign any opinions concluding that the 
President is not bound by particular laws; and the insertion of a permanent ethics 
advisor within OLC. The Rule also requires supervising lawyers to make greater 
efforts to learn of ethical misconduct on the part of their OLC subordinates and to 
make greater efforts to nimediate breaches, based in part on the seriousness of the 
issue at stake, e.g., potential waterboarding of detainees. The Rule also expands 
the definition of supervisor, clarifying that lawyers holding senior positions 
outside of OLC who review and comment upon drafts have an obligation to 
reasonably supervise the primary authors of the memo. Clarification of the 
supervisory role that certain Executive Branch lawyers play, and a corresponding 
delineation of their responsibilities, will deter lawyers, supervisors, and subordi-
nates alike, from succumbing to bystander apathy. As a result, lawyers will take 
greater ownership for the legal opinions generated by the office. In so doing, 
Executive Branch lawyers will develop and adhere to a normative foundation that 
demands fealty to the law above loyalty to the client. 
Section I of this Article provides a background on OLC and the authority of its 
opinions. I also review the drafting of the torture memoranda, including the role 
played by senior lawyers. Section II examines different approaches that have 
been taken to hold lawyers involved in the preparation of the memoranda 
accountable, specifically through civil lawsuits, OLC Guiding Principles and 
Best Practices, and government ethics investigations. Section III briefly ad-
dresses the literature on some of the perceived limitations in the current system 
for regulation of lawyers, particularly its normative shortcomings. Section N 
outlines Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1, which specifically addresses 
supervisory responsibility, as an example of a rule that can reflect an ethic of 
accountability without external enforcement. Finally, Sections V and VI discuss 
the proposed Rule 5.1 specific to OLC that would address OLC's unique 
authority, and require politically accountable senior Executive lawyers' 
meaningful dialogue with those lawyers drafting opinions. In recognizing the . 
inherently social and collective nature of lawyering, the Rule requires that rather 
than permitting instances of bystander apathy and deflection of responsibility, 
these interactions must be opportunities for generating norms that can 
establish a set of collective values for the Executive Branch. I also offer 
examples of how and why Rule 5.1 would apply to senior Executive lawyers 
Attorney General John Ashcroft and· Assistant Attorney General Michael 
Chertoff. 
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S DRAFTING OF THE 
TORTURE MEMORANDA 
A. THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 
Lawyers working in OLC wield unique and enormous power. Opinions 
authored by lawyers in the office can enjoy a force of authority akin to that of 
controlling law, and may even be kept secret. Pursuant to the Attorney General's 
delegation, the Assistant Attorney General who heads OLC is tasked with a 
number of responsibilities, including preparing formal opinions by the Attorney 
General, and assisting the Attorney General in his legal adviser capacity to the 
President and to the Cabinet. 10 The office may be asked to resolve legal disputes 
between differing executive agencies. 11 Formal written opinions by OLC 
constitute "controlling legal advice to Executive Branch officials in furtherance 
of the President's constitutional duties to preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution" and the "Take Care" Clause. 12 Because these opinions may address 
matters of first impression that will never be ruled on by a court, they may 
constitute the final and binding interpretation of law. 13 Finally, due to the often 
sensitive nature of the opinions, particularly those that may concern national 
security, they may go unpublished and undisclosed. 14 
The OLC, like other components of the Department of Justice, is headed by an 
Assistant Attorney General, a political appointee requiring Senate confirma-
tion.15 The Office is comprised of about two dozen lawyers, of whom a number 
may be Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, who are also political appointees but 
do not require Senate confirmation. 16 The bulk of the lawyers are career civil 
servants. 17 
OLC lawyers are subject to the same rules of professional responsibility as 
other lawyers. 18 As lawyers advising the President and other Executive Agency 
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 510-513 (2006); 28 C.F.R. 0.25(a) (2010). Also pertinent here, the regulations provide that 
the OLC is responsible for advising on the "legal aspects of treaties and other international agreements." 28 
C.F.R. 0.25(d) (2010). 
11. Exec. Order No. 12146, 1-4 (codified at 3 C.F.R. 409, 4100 (1980)); Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1577. 
12. See 2010 OLC Best Practices Memorandum, supra note 4; 2005 OLC Best Practices Memorandum 
supra note 4; Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1577. 
13. 2010 OLC Best Practices Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1; Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1577; Robert C. 
Power, Lawyers and the War, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 39, 49-50 (2009); Trevor Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office 
of Legal Counsel, 110 CoLUM. L. REv. 1448, 1463-68 (2010). 
14. The Office of Legal Counsel only publishes opinions which it has determined are "appropriate for 
publication." Office of Legal Counsel Website, Opinions, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opinions.htrn 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
15. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE BUDGET, CONGRESSIONAL 
SUBMISSION, (hereinafter FY 20ll PERFORMANCE BUDGET], available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ 
20lljustification/pdf/fyll-olc-justification.pdf; Morrison, supra note 13, at 1460. 
16. FY 20ll PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 15, at I; Morrison, supra note 13, at 1460. 
17. Morrison, supra note 13, at 1460. 
18. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 17. 
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heads, the most applicable rule governing their legal work is to be found in Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1, which requires a lawyer to "exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice." 19 As in many 
lawyering contexts, however, there arise tensions between the OLC lawyer's 
obligation to provide objective and candid advice to the client and to abide by or 
help realize the client's-here, the President's-objectives.20 The nature ofthe 
OLC position, however, offers, according to some scholars, a "schizophrenic 
choice" between objective interpreter of law and political advocate for adminis-
tration policies.21 
OLC's function as an effective maker of law for the Executive Branch 
distinguishes its relationship to the Executive from any traditional lawyer-client 
relationship. On the one hand, there is the aspirational view that the job of the 
Attorney General is to be an independent, impartial interpreter of the law. On the 
other hand, there is the historically based or realist view that the Attorney General 
and OLC attorney can be considered a legal policy figure, who seek to carry out 
the President's objectives first, with a secondary consideration of the legal 
constraints.Z2 
The conception of the independent and impartial legal adviser is best 
encapsulated in OLC Best· Practices memoranda and Guiding Principles that 
e1llerged in response to the initial public disclosure of the earliest opinions on 
torture and interrogation. Former OLC attorneys wrote that the "OLC should 
provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice 
will constrain the administration's pursuit of desired policies."23 The Guiding 
Principles appear to dismiss the "advocacy model of lawyering"-defined as the 
crafting of "merely plausible legal arguments to support their clients' desired 
actions"-because it "inadequately promotes the President's constitutional 
obligation to ensure the legality of executive action."24 Similarly, OLC issued a 
Best Practices memorandum in 2005, explaining that OLC must offer "candid, 
independent, and principled advice-even when that advice may be inconsistent 
19. MODEL RULES R. 2.1. 
20. Compare MODEL RuLES R. 2.1 with 1.2(a) and 1.3 (Diligence.) Notwithstanding changes in the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the tensions reflect the prior Code rule, which articulated a zealous 
representation on behalf of the client. The comment to Rule 1.3 retains the "zealous" strand, providing: "A 
lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy 
upon the client's behalf." Accordingly, the revisions and amendments to rules have not eradicated the vestiges of 
this tension. Indeed, one may query whether the current articulations in 1.2 and 1.3 in any way diminish the 
view, well-established in the bar's history and in popular imagination, of the paramount obligation of zealous 
representation. 
21. Power, supra note 13, at 49-50. See also John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the 
Attomey General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, !5 CARDOZO L. REv. 375,377,403 
(1993). 
22. See generally Norman Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attomey General, 60 
STAN. L. REv. 1931, 1933-36 (2008). 
23. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1. 
24. !d. 
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with the desires ofpolicymakers."25 And Professor Dawn Johnsen, a former OLC 
attorney and once nominee to head OLC during the Obama Administration, 
identified the Office's most important function as "the ability to say no to the 
President."26 This conception of the Office has elements of a judicial or 
quasi-judicial role, due in part to the binding effect of its opinions.27 Professor 
David Luban has contended that the obligation of impartiality is only heightened 
by virtue of the secret aspect and the constitutional obligation to "take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed. " 28 These views are further supported by the 
general notion that government lawyers must serve the public interest-that, in 
the words of the oft cited Berger v. United States opinion, "government has an 
overriding obligation to see that justice is done."29 
In contrast, the historical/realist view of OLC considers the role of the OLC 
attorney as more of an advocate or team player and enabler of Executive Branch 
policy.30 Johnsen aclmowledges that "OLC's role is more complicated than that 
of a disinterested arbiter.'m Professor Norman Spaulding questions what it even 
means to call for an independent Attorney General, contending that invariably the 
role, which entails offering opinions, is inherently "legal and political. " 32 In his 
history of the evolution of the Office of the Attorney General through the 
Reconstruction era, he describes an Office that has been politically accountable to 
the President, which requires the diminishment of independence, and which has 
25. 2005 OLC Best Practices Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1. 
26. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1582-83. 
27. !d. at 1581-82; see also DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 203 (2009) (describing legal 
advice as "quasi-judicial"; "written opinions binding entire departments of the government are judicial in a 
more direct way"). 
28. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 203; see also OPR Report, supra note 3, at 17 (noting that the lack of 
adversarial process makes the situation the OLC lawyer practices in similar to that of a lawyer appearing in an 
ex parte proceeding, which then requires disclosure of all material facts to court, whether or not they are 
adverse, citing MODEL RULES R. 3.3(d)). 
29. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 17, n. 18 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). But see 
Fred C. Zacharias, Practice, Theory, and the War on Terror, 59 EMORY L. J. 333, 343-45 (2009) (collecting 
sources criticizing concept of government lawyer's obligations to public interest over the client). For a 
discussion of the variation in the national security lawyer's duties based upon the identity of the client and the 
model oflegal practice, see JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS 
TIMES 317-25 (2007). 
30. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1583; McGinnis, supra note 21, at 377, 403; Power, supra note 13, at 
54-56 (discussing dueling allegiances of fidelity to law, being a team player, and an enabler). Also reflecting the 
"enabler" view, John Yoo observes that the Justice Department has a "long tradition in defending the President's 
commander-in-chief power." JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
185 (2006). 
31. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1581. 
32. See Spaulding, supra note 22, at 1934, 1968-69. In discussing independence of the Office of the Attorney 
General, Spaulding refers to a criterion that he insists must be employed separate from the context of ultra vires 
or illegal actions already taken by the Executive; otherwise, he explains, the term is oflittle utility in analyzing 
the conduct of governmental lawyers from the office. I d. at 1935. I too adopt this understanding of independence 
for purposes of this article. The inquiry concerns the independence of OLC's initial position or approach to 
issues and policies subjected to its analysis. 
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historically resisted any structural changes. 33 
Though agreeing "as a general matter" that OLC should serve an independent 
role, Professor Jack Goldsmith, former head of OLC, tempers his agreement with 
a series of "caveats," including questioning whether OLC may offer advice akin 
to "an attorney's advice to a client about what you can get away with and what 
you are allowed to do and what your risks are, something in between," whether 
OLC is bound by Supreme Court opinions, and the import of classification on that 
independent role.34 Similar to Spaulding, Goldsmith invokes the historical 
experience of OLC, contending that no head of the office has ever fully provided 
independent legal advice, citing the examples of Attorneys General Edward 
Bates' opinion supporting the suspension of habeas corpus and Robert Jackson's 
opinion supporting the destroyer for bases deal. 35 
Empirical research also evidences a very high tendency on the part of OLC to 
support the President. Professor Trevor Morrison found that of 245 publicly 
available OLC opinions written since the beginning of the Carter Administration 
through the first year of the Obama Administration, OLC supported the 
President's view in 193 opinions, or 79% of the time.36 Twenty opinions (8%) 
upheld some portion of the President's position and 32 opinions (13%) opposed 
the White House's view?7 
Ultimately, Goldsmith appears to have concluded there is not an articulable 
standard that governs OLC's provision of legal advice, telling ethics investigators 
he could not answer what is the role of OLC and whether an attorney has crossed 
a line.38 Notwithstanding the historical lack of independent legal advice, it is 
plainly unacceptable to permit OLC lawyers to provide opinions without any 
standard orienting their work and advice. 39 To be sure, the Best Practices 
33. ld. at 1953-68, 1977. Spaulding does not despair entirely of the possibility of securing some sort of 
independence for the Office of the Attorney General, as is discussed later in this article. See infra Part V.C.2. 
34. Margolis Memorandum, srlpra note 3, at 2. A fuller exploration of Goldsmith's views on the ambiguous 
and fraught nature of the OLC attorney's task may be found in GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 33-39. 
35. Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 18-19; GOLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 168, 195-99; see also John 
C. Dehn, Institutional Advocacy, Constitutional Obligations, and Professional Responsibilities: Arguments for 
Govemment Lawyering Without Glasses, 110 CoLUt-.1. L. REv. SIDEBAR 73, 74 (2010) (observing that OLC 
generally overvalues Executive branch institutional interests). 
36. Morrison, supra note 13, at 1476-79. Because the data do not include opinions that remain classified, the 
results may be skewed downward. As I discuss in greater detail, lawyers will feel more pr~ssured to provide 
legal support for Executive positions that are to be implemented in secret because the matters may concern 
national security and there will be few, if any, additional checks on the Executive's actions. See infra Part V. 
37. Morrison, supra note 13, at 1476-79. 
38. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. Goldsmith offers a more "cooperative" and revealing conception of the 
OLC's role and the office's limits in his own book, acknowledging an inevitable tension between articulating the 
law and realizing the President's objectives, but ultimately relying on the OLC's own culture and norms, 
GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 37-39, a sentiment shared by many OLC veterans. See, e.g., Guidelines, supra note 
4, at 1. 
39. Jesselyn Radack, a former OPR lawyer, proposes a new role for all government legal advisors that would 
include OLC lawyers. In addition to responsibilities set forth in Model Rule 2.1, the proposed rule would 
address some of the shortcomings evidenced in the torture memoranda. Proposed Rule 2.2 would require an 
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memoranda reflect that view, though they also share some of Goldsmith's 
ambivalence about the contours of the role, revealing the Office's seeming latent 
schizophrenia. However, a review of the actions taken by OLC lawyers in 
crafting the torture memoranda leaves open to question what standard they 
thought was governing their conduct. The lack of any articulation of standards by 
supervising attorneys during the period in which the initial opinions were written 
speaks both to an insufficiently defined legal framework for the OLC and an utter 
failure of senior lawyers in their supervisory responsibilities. 
B. THE TORTURE MEMORANDA 
On August 1, 2002, OLC issued a memorandum (Bybee Memo) concerning 
interrogation standards under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment as implemented by the 
torture statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.40 OLC also issued a classified 
memorandum (Classified Bybee Memo) that day explaining whether particular 
interrogation methods would violate the tmture statute. These opinions were 
drafted primarily by then Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and 
reviewed and signed off on by the head of OLC, then Assistant Attorney General 
JayS. Bybee. In support of a working group on detainee interrogations composed 
of military and civilian Defense Department personnel, Yoo provided another 
memorandum (Yoo Memo), which "incorporated the Bybee Memo virtually in its 
entirety," but focused on military, rather than CIA, interrogation.41 
Much of the attention following the leak of Bybee Memo to the press in June 
2004 has centered on the role ofYoo and Bybee in producing the opinions.42 On 
June 21, 2004, Congressman Frank Wolf asked the Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) to investigate the drafting of the Bybee Memo.43 Over the 
course of almost five years, the OPR investigated the drafting of the Bybee 
Memo, and the Classified Bybee Memo, as well as later opinions that purported 
to supersede the Bybee Memo and Classified Bybee Memo, as well as 
memoranda analyzing the applicability of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee 
Treatment Act, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and Article 16 of 
advising attorney to disclose majority legal positions when advocating "novel" positions, disclose adverse case 
Jaw, and provide advice on the "wisdom and morality" of the client's proposed course of action. Jesselyn 
Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: the Role of the Govemmellf Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. CoLO. L. 
REv. 1, 42 (2006). Professor Fred C. Zacharias proposes a "moral dialogue" between the lawyer and client when 
the conduct might be illegal, requiring a discussion of moral and political considerations. Zacharias, supra note 
29, at 262-63. 
40. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2. 
41. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 49-54. 
42. Yoo, in particular, has garnered significant amounts of attention. He has been an unapologetic defender of 
the memoranda and their reasoning and conclusions. See Yoo, supra note 30, at 165-202. 
43. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. 
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the Convention Against Torture, to interrogation techniques.44 
Based upon interviews with many of the most important government lawyers 
and relying upon government investigations, OPR constructed a comprehensive 
and detailed history of the creation of the interrogations memoranda. The impetus 
for the opinions was the CIA's interest in employing "harsh" and "more 
aggressive" interrogation techniques on an AI Qaeda detainee Abu Zubaydah, 
who had been captured in March 2002.45 The proposed techniques included, (1) 
attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial or insult slap, (5) cramped 
confinement, (6) insects placed in a confinement box, (7) wall standing, (8) stress 
positions, (9) sleep deprivation, (10) use of diapers and denial of toilet facilities, 
(11) waterboarding, and (12) mock burial.46 Concerned that the use of these 
techniques might expose personnel to criminal liability, the CIA sought an OLC 
opinion on the legality of the techniques. 47 
The Bybee memorandum arrived at a number of dubious conclusions 
concerning the torture statute, likely foreordained because, as many have 
observed, the authors "began with the objective of justifying torture."48 Based 
upon this legal analysis, the Classified Bybee Memo concluded that of the 
specific techniques that the CIA proposed using in interrogating Abu Zubaydah, 
ten interrogation techniques-including stress positions, sleep deprivation, 
exploiting the fear of insects, and waterboarding-would not violate the torture 
statute.49 Eventually, the Bybee Memo and other opinions concerning interroga-
tions were repudiated and have been roundly criticized by OLC attorneys and 
44. I d. at 5-9. 
45. I d. at 32-34. President Bush acknowledged this history in a speech on September 6, 2006. See George W. 
Bush, President, United States of America, Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected 
Terrorists, September 6, 2006 [hereinafter President Bush Speech], available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html. President Bush described as "tough" the 
"alternative set of procedures" used by the CIA, which were determined to be lawful by the Justice Department. 
46. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 35-36. The OPR Report redacted the twelfth technique but it is believed 
that, based upon a review of earlier drafts of the OPR Report, this technique was in fact mock burial. See "New 
Information on 'Mock Burials,"' TheTortureReport.org, February 26, 2010, http://www.thetorturereport.org/ 
diary/new-information-%E2%80%9Cmock-burials%E2%80%9D. These techniques were proposed by CIA 
psychologists who assisted in the United States Military's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) 
training. Although many of the same techniques proposed for use on Zubaydah were based upon ones used on 
U.S. military members in training them to resist interrogations by enemy captors, in contrast to the goal of the 
Zubaydah interrogation, SERE exercises were not permitted to develop in the trainee a feeling of "learned 
helplessness." OPR Report, supra note 3, at 34. 
47. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 37. There is some dispute about whether some of these proposed 
techniques were used on Zubaydah prior to receiving OLC's opinions. !d. at 33. 
48. Michael Hatfield, Professionalizing Moral Deference, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 1, 3 (2009); see 
also Interview with Jack Goldsmith, Frontline, "Cheney's Law, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/cheney/ 
interviews/goldsmith.html# ixzzlOFcgSapS ("The opinions had an unusually tendentious quality that was not 
really consistent with the norms of opinion writing in the Office of Legal Counsel. They were obviously 
stretching to reach a result rather than doing a more impassioned analysis."); Anthony Lewis, Making Torture 
Legal, THE NEW YoRK REVIEW OF BooKs, July 15, 2004 ("The memos read like the advice of a mob lawyer to a 
mafia don on how to skirt the law and stay out of prison."). 
49. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 37 (citing Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1-2). 
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scholars.50 
The OLC opinions were rife with questionable legal reasoning, omissions, and 
mischaracterization. For example, the Bybee Memo provides that in order to 
constitute a violation of the torture statute, the infliction of physical pain "must be 
equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as 
organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. "51 In providing this 
definition of "severe pail1" the opinion inexplicably relies on a "statute defining 
an emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health benefits."52 
Relying upon the health benefits statute was unreasonable because the objectives 
of that statute are wholly unrelated to those of the torture statute. 53 General rules 
of statutory construction provide that relying on such an unrelated statute is not a 
reliable method for divining legislative intent. 54 Moreover, the analysis suggests 
that anything short of organ failure or death does not constitute torture, an 
interpretation unsupported, to be sure, by the health benefits statute. 5 5 
The Bybee Memo also offers an overly facile analysis of specific intent. In 
order to run afoul of the torture prohibition, the Memorandum provides, the 
infliction of severe physical pain or severe mental pain or suffering must be the 
"defendant's precise objective." Even if a defendant knows that severe pain will 
result from his actions, he may lack specific intent if "causing such harm is not his 
objective, even though he does not act in good faith."56 The Memorandum 
ignores the fact that federal case law surrounding the meaning of specific intent is 
ambiguous and unclear.57 In addition, it improperly suggests that motive of the 
interrogator could impact the analysis even though the interrogator knowingly 
inflicts severe physical pain. 5 8 
50. See Memorandum from Acting AssistantAtt'y Gen. Daniel Levin to Deputy Att'y Gen. James B. Corney, 
Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 2 (December 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin 
Memorandum], available at http:/lwww.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm ("This memorandum super-
sedes the August 2002 Memorandum in its entirety."); Memorandum from Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. David J. 
Barron to Att'y Gen. Eric Holder, Re: Withdrawal of Office of Legal Counsel CIA Interrogation Opinions 1 
(Aprill5, 2009), available at http:/lwww.justice.gov/olc/2009/withdrawalofficelegalcounsel.pdf. Upon review-
ing the Yoo memorandum, the then incoming head of OLC, Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith 
described it as "flawed in so many important respects that it must be withdrawn." OPR Report, supra note 3, at 
85. Then Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin recalls that after he first read the Bybee Memo he 
thought: "'This is insane, who wrote this?'" ld. at 92. Then Yale Law School Dean, and current State 
Department Legal Adviser, Harold Koh called the Bybee Memo "perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal 
opinion I have ever read." JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF How THE WAR ON TERROR 
BECAME A WAR ON AMERlCAN IDEALS 152 (2008). 
51. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 67 (quoting Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1). 
52. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (2000)). 
53. OPRREPORT, supra note 3, at 128-133. 
54. ld. at 183 (citing NORMAN ]. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION 
§53:05 (6th ed. 2000)). 
55. See id. at 133. 
56. I d. at 257 (quoting Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 3). 
57. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 136. 
58. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 137. 
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In some instances, the Bybee Memo draws additional conclusions that are 
unsupported, defining "prolonged mental harm" as severe mental pain or 
suffering that must endure "for months or even years ... such as seen in mental 
disorders like posttraumatic stress disorder."59 The Memo cites no authority, 
legal or otherwise, for this conclusion. 60 
The Memo also ignores legal authority when it does not support a narrow 
definition of what constitutes torture. In its review of United States court 
decisions applying the Torture Victim Protection Act,61 the Memorandum 
focuses only on instances of physical torture, of an especially cruel and even 
sadistic nature, ignoring conduct of a less extreme nature that was also found to 
constitute torture. 62 
The Bybee Memo also grossly mischaracterizes seminal international law 
decisions, interpreting the Israeli Supreme Court's decision in PCATI v. Israe/,63 
to hold that certain interrogation techniques did not constitute torture.64 Yet that 
issue was not before the Israeli high court. The court instead held that the 
interrogation techniques of violent shaking, the "frog crouch," the "shabach" 
position, excessive handcuffing, hooding, and sleep deprivation were illegal;65 it 
did not attempt to define the techniques as either torture or other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment. 
Perhaps most excoriated have been the sections of the Memorandum that 
address possible instances in which interrogators do in fact torture detainees. The 
Bybee Memo opines that enforcement of the torture statute against interrogators 
"may be barred because [doing so] would represent an unconstitutional 
infringement ofthe President's authority to conduct war."66 This view, referred to 
as the "Commander in Chief' override, and predicated on an unchecked 
executive power, fails to even discuss Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
the seminal case on separation of powers during wartime. 67 In addition, it ignores 
the President's obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."68 
Finally, the Bybee Memo states that the common law defenses of necessity and 
59. !d. at 67 (quoting Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at I, 46). 
60. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 139. 
61. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
62. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 67 (citing Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 24, 27); see also OPR 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 143. Courts have found that beating of hands alone, for example, amounts to torture 
under the TVPA. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996); Tachiana v. Mugabe, 234 F. 
Supp. 2d 401, 420-423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); 
see also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 170 (D. Mass 1995) (14 hours interrogation session constitutes 
torture). 
63. HCJ Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service's Interrogation Methods 38 
I.L.M. 1471 [1999] (Isr.). 
64. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 146-49. 
65. 3 8 I.L.M. at 1482-84. 
66. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 68 (quoting Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2). 
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
68. U.S. CaNST., art. II, § 3; see also OPR Report, supra note 3, at 204. 
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self-defense "could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal 
liability" for violations of the torture statute.69 The memorandum provides 
virtually no case law in support of its conclusions and largely ignores critical 
components to the necessity defense, including imminence of threat and legal 
alternatives to violating the law.70 The opinion also fails to address Article 2.2 of 
the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which provides: "No exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or war, internal political instability 
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."71 
The ratification history of CAT further supports the view that the U.S. 
government understood that there were no exceptions, including the defenses of 
necessity and self-defense, to the prohibition against torture.72 This, too, was 
ignored in the opinion. 
Despite the solitary names in the signature blocks, these opinions and their 
questionable conclusions were not crafted in isolation. Although Yoo and Bybee 
(as well as the junior lawyer assigned to work with Yoo, Jennifer Koester) were 
the primary drafters of the memoranda, many other lawyers in OLC, the Office of 
Attorney General, and throughout the government reviewed, or were briefed on, 
drafts of the opinions. A number of lawyers provided comments and edits; some 
raised objections. But ultimately none objected sufficiently to prevent any of the 
ultimate conclusions set forth above from becoming part of binding opinions that 
approved waterboarding and other interrogation tactics. 
C. SUPERVISION OF THE TORTURE MEMORANDA 
A review of the process by which the torture memoranda were crafted provides 
useful insights into senior government lawyers' passivity when presented with 
OLC lawyers' opinions relating to the most significant constitutional, national 
security, and human rights matters. This review raises questions as to what 
engenders such passivity in high-level government lawyers and is the basis for 
my proposal that such lawyers be tasked with clear responsibility that can be both 
affirmatively structured as well as regulated. 
Initial discussions shortly after Zubaydah's capture about the advice needed 
included not only Yoo, who was OLC's "resident expert" on national security and 
foreign policy,73 but also National Security Council Legal Adviser John 
Bellinger, Assistant Attorney General and head of the Criminal Division Michael 
69. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 68 (quoting Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at46). 
70. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 157-72. 
71. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2.2, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
72. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 164-66. 
73. !d. at 26. 
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Chertoff, and CIA attorneys. 74 Attorney General John Ashcroft, upon being made 
aware of the request, limited access to information on the matter to Attorney 
General Counselor Adam Ciongoli, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, 
Bybee, and OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin.75 Yoo took 
on primary responsibility for drafting the memo, with junior attorney Koester, 
who was assigned to work under him.76 Philbin was named "second Deputy" on 
the opinions, with the responsibility to review the opinions before they were 
finalized.77 Yoo and Koester produced several different draft opinions over the 
course of the next four months. 78 
Several government lawyers beyond OLC were either provided copies of the 
memo drafts or were briefed on its content. Yoo provided the National Security 
Council a copy of the memo for comment. It also appears that Yoo met with and 
provided a copy of the memo to Chertoff, White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales, Deputy White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan, and Counsel to the 
Vice President David Addington. 79 
The actions, and lack thereof, by Ashcroft and Chertoff merit special attention 
here, given both their positions of authority and their particular roles in the 
opinion drafting process. In mid-July, 2002, Chertoff informed the CIA that the 
Criminal Division would not issue a declination to prosecute or pre-activity 
pardons for CIA interrogations violating the torture statute. 80 After Chert off 
refused to provide the CIA with an advance pardon, Yoo added two new sections 
to the memorandum, setting forth the Commander in Chief power to ovenide the 
prohibition against torture and defenses to violations of the statute. 81 
Chertoff apparently provided comments on drafts of the opinion dated as late 
as July 23, 2002.82 Yoo may have sought out Chertoff's comments after Philbin 
raised concerns about the specific intent analysis. 83 Chertoff aclmowledged 
receiving a copy of the memo and reading and returning it on the same day. 84 
Chertoff recalls expressing some misgivings about the specific intent analysis. 85 
Chertoff stressed the need for additional research about the effects of the 
74. Id. at 37. 
75. I d. at 39. 
76. Id. 
77. I d. at 39 n.41. 
78. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 43 n.48, 53, 59. 
79. Id. at 45-46. The memorandum was also provided to the FBI and CIA. I d. at 45. 
80. I d. at 47-48. 
81. Id. at 50-51. It is unclear exactly why the sections were added, though Yoo acknowledged the CIA may 
have suggested to him the need to answer questions about what would happen if the CIA did in fact torture 
someone "inadvertently." I d. at 51. The Vice President's counsel Addington testified that he told Yoo during a 
meeting with Gonzales that he was pleased that these issues were being addressed in the memorandum. I d. at 52. 
82. Id. at 53, 57. 
83. I d. at 57. 
84. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 58. 
85. I d. at 58-59. 
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interrogation techniques in order to bolster a good faith defense but he did not 
look "particularly closely" at the common law defenses. 86 As to the Commander 
in Chief section, he recalls telling Yoo, "''m not saying I disagree, but I'm not in a 
position to sign onto this."87 
With respect to the Attorney General's role, then-National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice said that she asked Ashcroft "personally to review and 
confirm" the OLC opinions.88 Yoo also stated that he briefed Ashcroft and his 
counselor Ciongoli on a regular basis about the draft memoranda. 89 On July 24, 
2002, Yoo informed CIA General Counsel John Rizzo that Ashcroft authorized 
him to tell Rizzo that the interrogation techniques of attention grasp, walling, 
facial hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, and wall standing, were lawful and 
could be used on Zubaydah.90 Also in late July, Yoo gave both Ashcroft and 
Ciongoli copies of the Bybee Memo but, according to Yoo, Ashcroft neither read 
nor provided any comments.91 According to Ciongoli, Ashcroft read the 
Classified Bybee Memo on interrogation techniques and had "vigorous discus-
sion" with Yoo about the opinion.92 Ashcroft ultimately concluded that "Yoo's 
position [on waterboarding] was aggressive, but defensible."93 The Bybee Memo 
and Classified Bybee Memo were shortly thereafter signed and became the 
effective Executive law of the land.94 
II. HOLDING GOVERNMENT LAWYERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR LEGAL ADVICE 
The revelation of the Bybee Memo, together with the disclosure of other 
86. !d. at 59. 
87. !d. 
88. SeeS. ARMED SERVICES COMM., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY 35 (2008) 
[hereinafter S. ARMED SERVICES CoMM., INQUIRY], available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/ 
Detainee%20Report%20Final_April% 2022%202009 .pdf. 
89. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 49. Yoo also recalls advising Ashcroft that the CIA had sought assurances 
that the CIA would not be prosecuted for using the proposed interrogation techniques. The number two official 
in the Department of Justice, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, was apparently briefed on the Bybee 
memo at some point though no other details on the nature of his awareness of the memo are known. !d. at 60 n. 
59. Bybee recalls that Ashcroft never requested to see a copy of the memo. !d. at 49 n. 52. 
90. !d. at 53. 
91. !d. at 60. 
92. !d. 
93. !d. 
94. This Article focuses on the roles and responsibility of senior Executive branch lawyers in relation to OLC 
lawyers. Executive branch lawyers acting entirely removed from OLC could be viewed as having different 
obligations with respect to neutrality. For example, as Daniel Levin said of the White House Counsel, "(P]art of 
their job is to push, you know, and push as far as you can. Hopefully, not push in a ridiculous way, but they want 
to make sure you're not leaving any executive power on the table." !d. at 131. However, Bruce Ackerman has 
questioned the legitimacy of the Office of White House Counsel, for precisely its inherent loyalty (and lack of 
objective and candid advice) to the President, and has advocated abolishing the Office. See Bruce Ackerman, 
Abolish the White House Counsel, SLATE, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2216710/. Although many of 
the same issues are implicated by OLC and White House Counsel, the latter office merits its own separate 
analysis elsewhere. 
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opmwns and the images and reports of torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib, 
Guantanamo, and at CIA black sites, spurred intense interest in the responsibility 
of lawyers, and condemnation of the objectivity, quality, and accuracy of the 
opinions.95 The concern over the quality and culpability of lawyers has spurred a 
number of approaches that may be characterized as reform-minded, which seek 
ex post or ex ante accountability in OLC. 
First, people alleging harm caused by interrogation techniques authorized in 
the Bybee memoranda may seek to hold lawyers responsible for these opinions 
civilly liable for the harms the victims have suffered. The lawsuit, Padilla v. 
Yoo,96 offers a useful window into the potential for such lawsuits leading to 
changes in OLC and holding lawyers accountable for their opinions. Second, 
current and former OLC lawyers, as well as scholars, have recommended 
structural changes within OLC and in other Executive agencies to prevent the 
issuance of opinions lacking sufficient breadth, objectivity, and candor.97 Finally, 
some have sought professional sanctions against the lawyers involved in the 
drafting of the Bybee Memo.98 Such sanctions might entail disbarment or lesser 
penalties including censure or suspension of one's license to practice law. The 
OPR investigation,99 an ultimately very public one, reflects the professional 
disciplinary approach, and offers a useful example by which to examine both the 
merits and flaws of this route. In addition, there have been efforts in Spain, thus 
far ineffective, to hold former United States government officials, including Yoo 
and Bybee, criminally liable for their role in the torture and coercive interroga-
tion of detainees. 100 Each of these approaches may assist in ensuring greater 
improvement in the quality of legal opinions, but none of them goes far enough in 
fostering a sustained dialogue between lawyers at the most senior level in the 
Department of Justice so that each lawyer is wrested from his passivity and held 
accountable for the opinions issued by OLC. 
A. CIVIL LIABILITY 
Civil lawsuits may be employed to effect changes in lawyering and a firm's 
infrastructure, 101 whether they are suits asserting malpractice claims or in some 
95. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 27, at 162-205 (pages cited are from chapter titled "The Torture Lawyers of 
Washington"); Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1578; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law 
and Morals, 91 CORNELLL. REv. 67, 120 (2005). 
96. 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
97. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1. 
98. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 12. 
99. !d. 
100. The Center for Constitutional Rights provides links to various documents connected to the Spanish 
criminal investigation into U.S. torture. See "The Spanish Investigation into U.S. Torture", CENTER FOR 
CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, available at http://www. ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/spanish-investigation-
us-torture. 
101. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? 77 CORNELL L. REv. I, 38 (1991). 
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cases, claims for the conduct and resulting hanns that were predicated on the 
advice of lawyers. In 2008, Jose Padilla and his mother filed a lawsuit against 
John Yoo, asserting Bivens claims based upon the hanns Padilla suffered while 
held as an enemy combatant, including harsh interrogations, which, Padilla 
alleges were "proximately and foreseeably" caused by Yoo's drafting of opinions 
including the Bybee Memo and Classified Bybee Memo. 102 The district court 
denied Yoo's motion to dismiss on all claims except one, for w]:lich the court 
granted leave to amend. 103 Significantly, the court found that Yoo's alleged role 
as a high-level government lawyer involved in policy determinations and his 
alleged knowledge about Padilla's detention made Padilla's ultimate treatment, 
including being subjected to harsh interrogation, a foreseeable result of Yoo's 
legal advice. 104 At first blush, this might suggest that civil liability may be a good 
route for holding supervisory lawyers accountable and deterring professional 
misconduct. 105 However, the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. lqbal106 has 
created significant hurdles, if not made it impossible, for people to bring claims 
asserting supervisory responsibility claims against federal government lawyers. 
In Iqbal the Supreme Court addressed claims of the plaintiff, a Pakistani 
Muslim immigrant, that a number of federal officials including Ashcroft and FBI 
Director Robert Mueller crafted a policy after 9/11 that led to his detention on 
account of his race, religion, and national origin and harsh conditions of 
confinement in violation of the First and Fifth Amendment. 107 The Court held, 
however, that the plaintiff could not bring Bivens actions based solely upon 
Ashcroft's and Mueller's alleged "'knowledge and acquiescence in their 
subordinates' use of discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions 
among detainees. "' 108 Misconduct on the part of the superior must be alleged, not 
simply knowledge of the subordinate's misdeed. 109 
Professor Judith Resnik explains that based upon this narrowing of Bivens 
claims, as well as the Court's new requirement that district courts assess the 
plausibility of pleadings in a complaint, high-level government officials are 
102. Complaint at 18, Padilla v. Yoo, (N.D. CaL Jan. 4, 2008), 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012-18 (N.D. CaL 
2009) No. C08-00035 (JSW). 
103. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1039. 
I 04. /d. at 1032-34. 
105. For a fuller discussion of the challenges such a suit may face, see John Steele, Jose Padilla and his 
mother sue John Yoo (fanner OLC lawyer), LEGALETHICSFORUM.COM, January 4, 2008, http:lllegalethicsforum-
.typepad.com/blog/2008/0!/jose-padilla-su.html; David Luban, Much Ado about Padilla v. Yoo, BALKINJZATJON, 
Jan. 13, 2008, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/0l/much-ado-about-padilla-v-yoo.html. 
106. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
107. /d. at 1942-43. 
I 08. /d. at 1949 (quoting Brief of Respondent at 46). 
109. /d. ("Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable 
for his or her own misconduct."). 
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effectively insulated from liability. 110 Justice Souter was no less sanguine about 
the prospect of holding senior officials responsible for their failure to properly 
supervise subordinates, stressing in his dissent: "Lest there be any mistake, in 
these words the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is 
eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely." 111 
The Iqbal decision may be seen as part of a continuing retrenchment of Bivens 
over the past thirty years as well as a near dissolution of means to bringing claims 
in the national security context since 9/11. 112 In addition to the hurdle posed by 
Iqbal, courts have generally foreclosed all Bivens claims by foreign citizens 
concerning treatment suffered outside of the United States, thereby limiting the 
pool of potential claimants who suffered abusive interrogations. 113 Thus the 
limited prospects of holding supervisors responsible for mistreatment based upon 
legal advice crafted by subordinates suggests civil liability may not be a fruitful 
route for obtaining accountability and changing the legal culture in OLC. 
B. CHANGES TO OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 
Following the disclosure of the Bybee Memo, a group of nineteen former OLC 
attorneys drafted Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel ("Guidelines") 
a proposed set of guidelines for OLC. 114 Most of these suggestions concern 
structural and procedural changes to the Office, based upon the view that 
"regularized internal processes and mechanisms are critical to maintaining 
['accurate and honest legal appraisals, unbiased by policymakers' preferred 
110. See Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay in Honor of Henry 
Monaghan, 110 CoLUM. L. REv. 579, 632 (2010). There have, however, been deviations from the expected 
drumbeat of cases following Iqbal. Similar to Padilla, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois denied former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's motion to dismiss a Bivens claim asserting 
cruel and inhumane treatment. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2010). The district court held 
that two American citizens' allegations of abusive treatment in connection with their detention in Iraq and 
allegations of Rumsfeld's authorization of new harsh interrogation tactics and his awareness of resulting 
mistreatment of detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq constituted sufficient personal involvement to overcome the 
hurdles posed by Iqbal. I d. at 963-65. 
111. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting). It appears that, depending upon the purposive 
involvement of the superiors and possibly the cause of action asserted, a Bivens cause of action might be 
permitted by the Court. 
112. See Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens after Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 255, 
266-68 (2010). 
113. See, e.g., In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 103 (D.D.C. 2007); Rasul v. 
Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8982 (Dec. 14, 2009); Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2007), vacated and rev'd, en bane, 585 F.3d 559 (2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). Indeed, in turning back Yoo's arguments that a Bivens claim should not be permitted 
because foreign relations concerns or special factors were implicated, the court distinguished the allegations of 
Padilla against Yoo from this line of cases because the facts in Padilla involved the treatment of an American 
citizen on American soil. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1024-25, 1029-30. 
114. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1576-79. 
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outcomes.']"115 A number of the Guidelines stress the importance of providing 
independent advice to the Executive, though they contain internal inconsisten-
cies, encouraging support for executive initiatives and yet counseling against 
partiality.ll6 
Many of these proposals advocate increased transparency, supporting both 
publication of the standards governing the drafting of OLC opinions and public 
disclosure of opinions.117 Proponents contend that the "likelihood of public 
disclosure will encourage both the reality and the appearance of governmental 
adherence to the rule of law by deterring 'excessive claims of executive 
authority.'" 118 One legislative proposal, for example, that Congress ultimately 
failed to pass, the "OLC Reporting Act of 2008," required the Attorney General 
to report to Congress instances in which OLC concludes that a federal statute is 
unconstitutional or that a federal statute does not apply to the Executive 
Branch. 119 In addition, the Guidelines encourage a greater involvement of other 
affected government agencies and Justice Department divisions before providing 
an opinion.120 
Unfortunately the transparency provisions are riddled with caveats. Although 
the Guidelines call for public disclosure when an opinion advises that the 
Executive need not adhere to a federal statutory requirement, they permit 
exceptions based upon "the most compelling need for secrecy." 121 In our 
post-9/11 world, an executive of any political stripe will readily assert these 
115. /d. at 1595 (quoting id. at 1608). Spaulding endorses the Guidelines as well, though he harbors 
skepticism that "major structural guarantees of independence" can be implemented in the Office of the Attorney 
General. See Spaulding, supra note 22, at 1968-69. In order to effect structural changes, however, Spaulding 
advocates making the guidelines enforceable (though he is unclear on how to do so), publicly disclosing 
opinions, limiting the office's political accountability to the President, and a resolution of the tensions between 
such political accountability and the lawlessness that that breeds. See id. at 1978-79. Other proposals regarding 
the structure of OLC have been more combative and condemnatory, suggesting an entire revamping of the 
office. For example, Professor Bruce Ackerman proposes dispensing with OLC, and establishing in its place, an 
"executive tribunal." Comprised of nine ']udges for the executive branch," who serve twelve-year terms, and 
must be Senate-confirmed, congressional committees would challenge proposed executive actions before the 
tribunal, prior to such actions becoming law for the executive branch. See Bruce Ackerman, How to Keep 
Future John Yoos under Colltrol, WASH. PosT., February 23, 20 I 0. 
116. See discussion of OLC, supra at Part II.A. 
117. See Guidelines, supra note 4. 
118. /d. 
119. SeeS. REP. No. 10-528 (2008). As might have been expected, and without a trace of irony, the OLC 
opined that the proposed legislation was unconstitutional because it interferes with the President's authority 
over classified information and because it impinges on confidential legal advice protected by executive 
privilege. See Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Att'y Gen., Re: U.S. Dep't of Justice, Constitutionality of 
the OLC Reporting Act of 2008 1-4 (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2008/olc-reporting-
act.pdf. 
120. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1600; see also Michael P. Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DuKE J. COMP. & 
lNT'L L. 389, 411 (2010) (recommending rule requiring State Department's Legal Adviser's advice on matters 
concerning international law). 
121. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1607. 
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secrecy justifications. 122 The Guidelines similarly qualify a presumption for 
disclosure, stating that there is "some legal advice that properly should remain 
confidential, most notably, some advice regarding classified and some other 
national security matters." 123 Thus, in matters of national security and the limits 
of executive power and authority-the very areas where there have been, and 
remain, the greatest potential for abuse-the Guidelines would appear to sanction 
a de facto secrecy rule. 
In addition to potential weaknesses in the substance of the Guidelines and 
other proposals, there are concerns about their lack of enforceability. For 
example, the recommendation that other government agencies and Justice 
Department components be consulted in the crafting of an opinion is sound. 
However, without requiring that the opinions of other agencies and components 
be afforded significant weight or that those individuals bear responsibility in 
some form, there is little reason to think that this proposal will change the status 
quo. In fact, as the OPR account of the drafting of the memoranda reveals, 
members of the CIA, FBI and National Security Council were consulted. The 
Justice Department Criminal Division head, Michael Che1toff, provided com-
ments to drafts; yet the Bybee Memo still emerged, largely unaffected by any 
criticisms. The problem was not that not enough lawyers were consulted, but that 
not enough of them may have felt sufficiently responsible for the underlying 
opinion which they reviewed in some form or another. 
C. INDIVIDUAL LAWYER PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT 
Notwithstanding the wide net cast by the OPR in its investigation of OLC 
memoranda on interrogations, the focus was ultimately myopic, training its 
attention on individual lawyers' misconduct, rather than looking more broadly, 
with an eye toward the institutional and institutional leaders' actions, and, in 
many cases more importantly, inaction. The OPR Report concluded that as the 
person "primarily responsible" for the Bybee Memo and Classified Bybee 
Memo, 124 "Yoo committed intentional professional misconduct when he violated 
his duty to exercise independent legal judgment and render thorough, objective, 
and candid legal advice." 125 
122. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane), cert. denied 
2011 U.S. LEXIS 3575(2011) (affirming dismissal of case based upon government's assertion of state secrets 
privilege). Notwithstanding the Obama administration's purportedly different policies regarding state secrets, 
"officials at the 'highest levels of the Department of Justice' of the new administration" determined the state 
secrets privilege invoked by the Bush administration in the case was appropriate. See id. at 1078. 
123. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1607-08. The Guidelines further provide that "OLC should consider the 
views regarding disclosure of the client agency that requested the advice." /d. at 1608. One envisions agencies 
working on national security issues, including clandestine agencies such as the CIA, rarely favoring public 
disclosure. 
124. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 251. 
125. /d. at 260. 
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OPR also concluded that Bybee committed professional misconduct because 
he recklessly disregarded "his duty to exercise independent legal judgment and 
render thorough, objective, and candid legal advice."126 OPR determined that as 
"head of OLC and signator" of the memoranda, he bore personal responsibility 
for providing "thorough, objective, and candid" legal advice. 127 
In his review of the OPR Report, however, David Margolis reversed the 
findings, determining that neither lawyer had committed professional miscon-
duct.128 Margolis found that both Bybee and Yoo had "exercised poor judgment" 
but ultimately detennined that their actions did not merit a Justice Department 
referral to a state bar disciplinary authority. 129 As framed by· Margolis, the issue 
was whether Yoo and Bybee fulfilled their "obligation not to provide advice to 
their client that was knowingly or recklessly false or issued in bad faith, to 
provide competent representation, and to explain the matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding 
the representation." 130 
Margolis acknowledged Yoo's own misconduct was "a close question." 131 He 
criticized Yoo for espousing his extreme views on executive power in his opinion 
to the detriment of his institutional client.132 Margolis further noted that the 
"memos suggest that he failed to appreciate the enormous responsibility that 
comes with the authority to issue institutional decisions that carried the 
authoritative weight of the Department of Justice."133 The Bybee Memo 
"consistently took an expansive view of executive authority and narrowly 
construed the torture statute while often failing to expose (much less refute) 
countervailing arguments and overstating the certainty of its conclusions."134 
Regarding Bybee, Margolis found that his supervisory role mitigated any finding 
of misconduct, and determined that "the preponderance of the evidence does not 
support a finding that he knowingly or recklessly provided incorrect advice or 
126. /d. at 260. The role of Patrick Philbin is an interesting one here. See id. at 257-58. He appears to have 
fulfilled his second Deputy responsibilities as envisioned, reporting his reservations up the chain of command to 
Bybee, the head of OLC. Although Philbin may have walked back somewhat from his criticisms, he had 
provided enough information to Bybee such that Bybee should have known that there were sufficient problems 
in the memorandum that merited redress. In Goldsmith's account, it was Philbin who brought to his attention the 
problems in the OLC opinions. GOLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 142. While Philbin may be viewed as having done 
all that could be expected of him, the failure to make significant changes reflects a need for additional checks 
and balances in the form of enhanced supervisory responsibility, perhaps requiring explicit articulation of the 
concerns and countervailing views in the memo itself. See Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 20-21. 
127. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 255. 
128. Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 67-68. 
129. !d. at 68. 
130. Jd. at 27. 
131. Jd.at67. 
132. ld. 
133. Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 67. 
134. I d. at 68. 
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that he exercised bad faith." 135 Notwithstanding the reversal on findings of 
professional misconduct, Margolis characterized the torture memoranda as "an 
unfortunate chapter in the history of the Office of Legal Counsel." 136 
Notably, OPR did not find that any other lawyers who reviewed or were briefed 
on the opinions committed professional misconduct. 137 Although OPR repeat-
edly found that Justice Department officials should have acted in response to the 
opinions in various ways, it appears to have ultimately concluded that their 
passivity was reasonable in light of OLC's authority to provide binding opinions. 
We found Michael Chertoff, as AAG of the Criminal division, and Adam 
Ciongoli, as counselor to the AG, should have recognized many of the Bybee 
Memo's shortcomings and should have taken a more active role in evaluating 
the CIA program. John Ashcroft, as Attorney General, was ultimately 
responsible for the Bybee and Yoo Memos and for the Department's approval 
of the CIA program. Ashcroft, Chertoff, Ciongoli, and others should have 
looked beyond the surface complexity of the OLC memos and attempted to 
verify that the analysis, assumptions, and conclusions of those documents were 
sound. However, we cannot conclude that, as a matter of professional 
responsibility, it was umeasonable for senior Department officials to rely on 
advice from OLC. 138 
Based on this line of reasoning, a senior Justice Department lawyer could 
reasonably acquiesce in any and all opinions offered by OLC lawyers, never 
speaking up or objecting because of the exalted station the OLC lawyer occupies. 
Such reasoning is outcome determinative and ignores the interactive and social 
process by which legal opinions are crafted. It is hard to understand why the 
Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General-highly experienced govern-
ment attorneys with particular criminal expertise-should have properly relied 
on opinions of this level of consequence, particularly criminal matters, drafted 
primarily by Yoo-a relatively youthful and inexperienced lawyer without any 
criminal expertise. 
OPR's natTowly focused findings concerning individual lawyers' professional 
misconduct, to say nothing of the Margolis Memo reversing OPR's findings, may 
reflect the inevitably political nature of any inquiry of government lawyers, but 
also demonstrate, what is for many, the inherently limited nature of the current 
state of regulation of lawyers. 139 
135. !d. at 64. 
136. ld. at 67. 
137. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 259. 
138. ld. (emphasis added). Because OPR made no findings of misconduct with respect to these senior 
lawyers, Margolis did not address their roles in his memorandum. 
139. Much of Margolis's criticism of the OPR Report is based upon his view that OPR relied on the more 
aspirational aspects of the Best Practices memoranda and the Guidelines in finding that Yoo and Bybee 
committed professional misconduct, rather than identifiable and lower standards in the D. C. Professional Rules 
o.fConduct. See Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 12-13, 14-27, 68. 
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A broader inquiry asks for judgments on high 1evellawyers, which is of course 
politically sensitive, but it also treads upon larger policy questions, and veers 
from a formalistic rule based approach to ethics to one addressing the legal 
framework and the normative foundation of the legal process in OLC and the 
Justice Department. Ultimately, the limited findings reveal one of the weaknesses 
in the external regulation of lawyers' professional conduct, which, having been 
focused on the bad man or bad lawyer, lack an aspirational or normative element, 
that was found in earlier iterations of codes addressing the conduct of lawyers. 140 
Specifically, scholars have complained that the OPR report and Margolis Memo 
never addressed whether the OLC opinions, and not simply the Bybee Memo, but 
the later opinions written by successor OLC chiefs, were correct in their analysis 
of torti.Ire but instead just addressed the manner of the analysis, dodging the moral 
question of torture. 
III. THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF REGULATION OF LAWYERS 
Critics of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct argue that the Rules focus 
too much on the Holmesian "bad man" and, by extension, the "bad lawyer," 
rather than articulating a more aspirational view of lawyering that had been set 
forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility, and its predecessor, the Canons 
of Professional Ethics. 141 The problem is that the regulation of lawyers is now 
primarily a formalistic and instrumentalist inquiry rather than a normative one. 
Put another way, the rules now focus only on the manner of lawyering and ignore 
the substantive legal determinations. Form is elevated over substance. The 
narrow focus on individual bad lawyering ignores the underlying legal issues that 
may permit or even foster that singular misconduct. Practically, it remains less 
than clear whether the sanctions on individual lawyers have a deterrent effect on 
individual lawyers' conduct let alone the bar, a firm, or a government agency. A 
more holistic approach is recommended by some, an inquiry and framework that 
would also consider the collective nature of lawyering that enables such 
individual conduct. 
A. FORMALISM AND DETERRENCE VS. NORMS AND ASPIRATIONS 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct emerged in 1983, in large measure, 
in response to criticisms of the "equivocal aspirational ambitions" and "interpre-
tive dilemmas" in the earlier Canons' and Model Codes' ethical consider-
140. Discussed infra in Part ill.A. 
141. Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CALIF. L. 
REv. 1273, 1283 [hereinafter Rostain, Ethics Lost] (1998); see also Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism 
and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669, 673-74 (1978); William H. Simon, The Ideology of 
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 36-37 ( 1978). 
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ations. 142 Now, some have argued, the pendulum has swung too far in the other 
direction. The Model Rules eschew the early formulations of legal ethics for a 
perceived more simple approach. 143 In so doing, critics contend, the adoption of 
the Model Rules lead to greater reliance on external agency regulation and a focus 
on disincentives to overcome lawyers' acting in their own self-interest. 144 This 
sort of regulation of the legal profession will meet only middling success, 
however, because it lacks a "nonnative foundation that ties law practice to 
broader collective values." 145 
Professor Tanina Rostain argues that current regulation of lawyers adheres too 
closely to a behavioral economics polestar. The behavioral economics model 
posits that lawyers will advocate for their clients in unscrupulous fashion because 
it is in their economic self-interest to do so. 146 Lawyers will craft whatever murky 
legal arguments are needed in support of their clients' objectives, in pursuit of 
financial reward, but under the guise of zealous advocacy. Only by punishing, 
and thereby disincentivizing, overzealous advocacy will the misconduct be 
deterred. 
Rostain criticizes the regulation of lawyers tethered to a behavioral economics 
model as both unrealistic and undesirable. Rostain contends that first, "people 
obey laws not primarily because they fear sanctions but because they have 
internalized commitments to legal institutions and values." 147 Second, a set of 
rules predicated on legal representation of the "bad man" and that promote 
"neutral partisanship" lacks a normative foundation. 148 Rostain does not despair 
of any and all utility of the regulation of lawyers; the focus on rules should, 
however, "reflect and communicate a collective understanding of the appropriate 
parameters of professional relationships, separate from how frequently or rarely 
they are enforced." 149 Thus rules may embody and inculcate infrastructural 
changes and norms, facilitating at once aspirational and deterrent objectives. 
What constitutes a normative foundation remains a hotly contested terrain. 
What should govern situations confronting any lawyer, let alone an OLC lawyer 
and her supervisors? Luban has asserted that an individual's morality must orient 
the lawyer's decisions, contending, for example, "Lawyers should approach laws 
defending basic human dignity with fear and trembling." 150 A number of scholars 
142. See STEPHEN G!LLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYER: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 10 (8th ed. 2009); 
Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra note 141, at 1292-1303. 
143. !d. at 1302-03. 
144. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 31,44-53 (1995); Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra, note 141, at 1299. 
145. Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra note 141, at 1302-03. 
146. ld. at 1276-77, 1302-03. 
147. ld. at 1303. 
148. ld. at 1312-13. 
149. Tanina Rostain, Partners and Power: The Role of Law Finn Organizational Factors in Attorney 
Misconduct, 19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 281, 287 [Hereinafter Rostain, Partners and Power] (2006). 
150. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 205. 
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have criticized Luban's privileging of individual morality in these situations, 
raising concerns over subjectivity, moral pluralism and suggesting he unjustifi-
ably disregards the values of the legal and political systems. Is I In the end, one 
fears, we are simply left in an unsatisfying, "'lonely subjective world' of inchoate 
personal value."I52 The discomfort with establishing individual morality as a 
normative foundation for lawyering is understandable. Yet a norm offealty to the 
client owing to professional obligation, tempered only by a sLrict Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct-based consciousness and occasional regulation is not a 
sufficient normative foundation either. 
Luban's approach is more nuanced than his critics would acknowledge. Luban 
does not simply insist that individual morality should trump professional 
obligations in all instances. Rather, he insists that by requiring "moral activism" 
on the part of lawyers, lawyers cannot defend all of their conduct based simply on 
their obligations to the client when confronting legal ethical questions.153 Facing 
exceptional circumstances, in particular, lawyers must weigh their own morality 
against their "professional role morality," i.e., their obligations to the client. I 54 
Though verging on the metaphysical for some, Luban's approach is especially 
salient for the OLC attorney. More than most lawyers, the OLC lawyer faces 
significant pressure to realize his client's objective; the client is, after all, the 
President, and the advice sought is of national import, often relating to national 
security. Moreover, the questions frequently entail very difficult ethical ques-
tions, like whether particular interrogation techniques constitute torture. Many 
times, the legal answers are not clear and are mixed with questions of policy. 
Former lawyers from OLC insist that there is an institutional culture and sense 
of integrity at the office that serves as normative foundation, which will generally 
withstand the potential pressures associated with having a President as client. Iss 
But they aclmowledge and endorse the need to serve the client, suggesting that 
the fealty to the client may at times tip the balance in favor of deference to the 
Executive's preferred course of action. In addition, in a post-9/11 world, there 
151. An extensive discussion and debate over Luban's emphasis on the individual lawyer's conscience over 
the institutional system's values may be found in a colloquium on Luban's LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY. 
See Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1311 (2008); Katherine R. Kruse, The Human 
Dignity of Clients, 93 CORNELLL. REv.l343 (2008); William H. Simon, The Past, Present, and Future of Legal 
Ethics: Three Comments for David Luban, 93 CORNELLL. REv. 1365 (2008); Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of 
Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1377 (2008); W. Bradley Wendel, 
Legal Ethics as "Political Moralism" or the Morality of Politics, 93 CoRNELL L. REv. 1413 (2008). Goldsmith 
also would consider this invitation to moral inquiry an improper expansion of OLC's brief. GoLDSMITH, supra 
note 5, at 147-48 ("OLC's ultimate responsibility is to provide information about legality, regardless of what 
morality may indicate, and even if harm may result."). 
152. Rostain, Ethics Last, supra note 141, at 1298 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Personal Values and 
Professional Ethics, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 133, 140 (1992)). 
153. David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1437, 
1444-45 (2008). 
154. /d. at 1445. 
155. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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may also be an inclination on the part of OLC to provide the Executive Branch 
client what it wants, out of a fear of otherwise being perceived as risk-averse. 156 
Should the OLC counsel against the client's desired course of action too often, 
the client may stop seeking its legal advice. What may be the only thing standing 
in the way of giving the President exactly what he wants are OLC lawyers' own 
morality. 157 
B. REGULATION OF OLC OPINION AUTHORS AND SUPERVISORS 
The OPR Report and Margolis Memorandum's failure to address the 
soundness of the opinions' conclusions, for example, whether it was correct to 
conclude that Congress could not prohibit the President from ordering torture, 
reflects the absence of a normative foundation in current regulation of lawyers. It 
also explains, in part, why succeeding OLC opinions on interrogation and their 
authors were not subject to the same criticism by OPR. 
With respect to the scope of inquiry, OPR made clear its purely instrumentalist 
approach: "We did not attempt to determine and did not base our findings on 
whether the Bybee and Yoo Memos arrived at a conect result." 158 Or, as Margolis 
put it, "OPR found Yoo and Bybee to have engaged in misconduct not because 
they were wrong, but because they were not thorough." 159 This limited focus 
intentionally misses the bigger picture. 160 
Later OLC opinions, intended to supersede the Bybee Memo, did not arrive at 
different- conclusions, yet they largely escaped criticism. For example, then 
Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin authored a replacement memo 
(the "Levin Memo") on December 30, 2004, characterizing the Bybee Memo's 
discussion of the President's commander in chief power and defenses to liability 
as "unnecessary" and "inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive 
that United States personnel not engage in torture." 161 The Levin Memo also 
modified the Bybee Memo's analysis of "severe pain," expanding it to include 
pain beyond only that associated with "organ failure." 162 However, in a footnote, 
!56. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 91-98, 163-64 (discussing risk-averse effect of legal opinions on 
intelligence operations). 
157. Psychologists studying impulses toward obedience similarly suggest locating an alternative source of 
authority in order to resist automatic obedience, such as one's "religious, spiritual, political, or philosophical 
commitments." PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKlNG, AND 
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 556 (20 1 0) (citing PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & 
MARK R. LIEPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 75 ( 1991 )). 
158. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 160. 
159. Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 21. 
160. See David Cole, They Did Authorize Torture, But ... , THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, AprilS, 2010, 
at 42 ("In a more ti.mdamental sense, however, both the OPR Report and Margolis failed to confront the real 
wrong at issue. They focused exclusively on the manner by which Yoo and Bybee arrived at their result, rather 
than the result itself."). 
161. Levin Memorandum, supra note 50, at 2. 
162. /d. 
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the Levin Memo noted that notwithstanding the disagreements with the Bybee 
Memo's analysis of legal standards, the conclusions themselves would not be 
disturbed. 163 In other words, all interrogation techniques, including waterboard-
ing, were still legal. 
Luban suggests that the Levin Memo escaped the same criticism and judgment 
only because it "sounded more moderate than Bybee."164 But in fact, "the Levin 
memo makes only minimum cosmetic changes to the bits of Bybee that drew the 
worst publicity."165 Luban further contends that succeeding opinions also failed 
to provide objective analyses and instead were, rather, "aggressive advocacy 
briefs" intended to support the CIA interrogation regime. 166 
Professor David Cole explains OPR's agnostic approach to the issue of torture 
as a means of avoiding a collective indictment. Addressing "the legality of the 
brutality itself ... would have implicated not only John Yoo and Jay Bybee, but 
all of the lawyers who approved these methods over the five-year course of their 
application."167 That finding would have simply been too politically fraught. 168 
Moreover, a finding of illegality would have raised questions about the 
interrogation program itself and CIA interrogators' reliance on the memoranda 
and their potential culpability for actions taken based upon the legal opinions. 169 
What these outcomes reflect then are the limits of the current legal regulatory 
framework, which permits even external regulators to avoid making findings 
when confronted by certain political pressures. 
It is this Article's contention, however, that the professional responsibility 
project should be reoriented in its application to OLC. Application of profes-
sional rules to OLC should examine the collective legal process that is 
responsible for the misconduct, which necessarily requires an inquiry into 
163. ld. at 2 n. 8. 
164. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 180. 
165. /d. For a contrary opinion on the positive impact and changes made by the Levin Memo, see 
GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 144-51, 163-65, in which he explains the decision to withdraw the Bybee Memo. 
Goldsmith indicates that his primary concern regarding the opinions was that the overbroad arguments could be 
employed to justify "much more aggressive" interrogations than the ones specifically authorized. I d. at I 5 I. The 
Levin Memo's changes should have dispelled at least that possibility. 
166. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 198. 
167. Cole, supra note 160, at 42. 
168. Oddly enough, Yoo and Bybee have in many ways become the "scapegoats" of the torture memoranda. 
It is they, and they alone, according to the OPR Report, and, it would seem, the popular narrative, who bear 
responsibility for any misconduct that Jed to the crafting of the opinions authorizing waterboarding and other 
interrogation techniques. They are the proverbial "bad apples." 
169. The reliance of the intelligence community and CIA operatives on the OLC's opinions bedeviled 
Goldsmith as he contemplated withdrawing the Bybee Memo, and the ultimate withdrawal apparently affected 
intelligence gathering due to ambiguity over the legal analysis. GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 152, 163-65. 
Notwithstanding the Obama administration's withdrawal of many Bush-era OLC opinions on interrogation, 
Attorney General Eric Holder addressed these same concerns of criminal culpability, stating that the Justice 
Department would "'not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance 
given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees.'" Mark Mazzetti & Charlie 
Savage, No Criminal Charges Sought over CIA Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, November 9, 2009. 
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supervisors' responsibility for the opinions and a discussion of underlying OLC 
norms. 170 This collective analysis is particularly necessary in the case of OLC, 
which renders opinions that not only have the force of law but authorize policies 
of national and international import. Limiting ethics reviews of OLC opinions to 
an instrumental analysis of simply the drafters' manner of analysis ignores the 
very real effect that these legal opinions have in the world. A properly formulated 
conception of reasonable supervision of OLC opinions demands greater account-
ability for high-level lawyers. Such accountability will compel a discussion 
between lawyers of the normative foundations of tbe drafting of the opinions, and 
a confrontation with the memorandum's real world consequences. 
IV. SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY AS A BRIDGE FROM SIMPLE RULE 
ENFORCEMENT TO STRUCTURAL, NORM GENERATION 
The idea of supervisory responsibility arises from, what would seem, tbe 
uncontroversial position that every case of professional discipline raises the 
question of reasonable supervision. 171 A lawyer's misconduct simply precipitates 
the logical inquiry: who was his boss? What was she doing while the subordinate 
lawyer acted unethically? This relatively simple concept recognizes that, outside 
of the solo-legal practice, no lawyer is an island. The Restatement on the Law 
Governing Lawyers, in its articulation of the rules on supervision of lawyers, 
observes that lawyers in law firms, law departments of corporations, and 
government agencies do not "operate as free agents in their work relating to the 
representation of clients."172 In essence, this is simply the "general principle of 
personal responsibility for acts of another." 173 
The Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1 on "Responsibilities of Partners, 
Managers, And Supervisory Lawyers," provides in its entirety: 
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with 
other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving 
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct if: 
170. See Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra note 141, at 1337-38. 
171. Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory Duties, 10 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 259, 285 (1994). 
172. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: SUPERVISION OF LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS 
WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION (2000) (Introductory Note) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
173. MODEL RULES R. 5.1 cmt. 4. 
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(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the 
conduct involved; or 
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law 
firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority 
over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its 
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial 
action. 174 
297 
Sections (a) and (b) of Rule 5.1 detail the duties of supervisory lawyers to both 
craft general firm or law department practices and policies that ensure ethical 
conduct by all lawyers and take specific actions to ensure ethical conduct when 
directly overseeing a lawyer's work. The drafters of Rule 5.1 did not, however, 
intend to establish a form of vicarious liability that imputes liability based upon 
the subordinate lawyer's misconduct. 175 Rather, these sections establish an 
"independent duty of reasonable supervision in Rule 5.1 [that] is affirmative and 
absolute; the failure to provide such reasonable supervision constitutes the 
lawyer's own independent violation which is the unethical conduct warranting 
professional discipline." 176 
Section (c)(l) of Rule 5.1 sets forth what has been characterized as a form of 
"accessorial liability" for a lawyer who ratifies or orders her subordinates' 
misconduct. 177 Section (c)(2) creates a "duty to rectify" misconduct when a 
supervisor learns of it and the consequences of which can be prevented or 
minimized. 178 Concerning the latter, the extent of the supervisor's remedial 
obligation depends upon the "immediacy" of his "involvement and the serious-
ness of the misconduct." 179 The supervisor must take whatever steps are required 
to preclude "avoidable consequences" of the wrongdoing. 180 
Both subsections of 5.1(c) predicate a supervising lawyer's responsibility on 
knowledge of the misconduct. Under the model rules, knowledge is defined as 
"actual knowledge of the fact in question," 181 though, "[a] person's knowledge 
may be inferred from circumstances."182 In addition, the drafting history of Rule 
5.1(c)(l) makes clear that the drafters "intended to remove any possibility of 
174. MoDEL RULES R. 5.1. Section 11 of The (Third) Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, supra note 
172, provides essentially the same responsibilities for a supervising lawyer that are provided in Model Rule 5.1, 
though it includes the responsibilities as they also relate to non-lawyers, which are set forth in Model Rule 5.3. 
175. Miller, supra note 171, at 276-77; see supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text for useful discussion of 
resistance to holding supervising lawyers vicariously responsible for other lawyers. 
176. Miller, supra note 171, at 277-78. 
177. RESTPJ"EMENT, supra note 172, at§ II cmt. e (discussing sec. 3(a), equivalent of 5.1(c)(l )). 
178. Miller, supra note 171, at 278 n. 86 (acknowledging the relationship between the prevention function in 
Rule 5.1(a) and (b) and the curative function of Rule 5.1(c)). 
179. MoDEL RULES R. 5.1, cmt. 5. 
180. MoDEL RULES R. 5.1, cmt. 5. 
181. MoDEL RULES R. l.O(f). 
182. MoDEL RULES R. l.O(f). 
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supervisory responsibility being imposed on a lawyer who had no knowledge of 
specific conduct." 183 
However, a discernible "knowledge creep" has been noted in the way ethics 
committees and courts have interpreted this requirement. 184 Courts and regula-
tory authorities have been loathe to find a lack of knowledge when supervising 
lawyers have not complied with their affirmative and preventive obligations 
under 5.1(a) and (b); if a lawyer fails to take the necessary steps to prevent 
misconduct, he cannot subsequently claim ignorance when the misconduct in fact 
occurs. 185 Similarly, the Restatement commentary explains that "[l]ack of 
awareness of misconduct" does not excuse a supervising lawyer who has not 
taken "reasonable measures" to ensure the subordinate's compliance with 
professional standards. 186 For example, a federal district court held in addressing 
Rule 5.3(c), the analogous rule for supervision of non-lawyers, that a supervising 
lawyer "without actual knowledge of' a paralegal's misconduct is "responsible 
for the conduct where the attorney would have known about the conduct but for 
the attorney's negligence or recklessness." 187 To some extent, these cases and 
opinions hold that a supervising· lawyer can be said to have constructive 
knowledge of misconduct, and therefore be obligated to remedy consequences of 
that conduct. 188 Only two jurisdictions-New York and the District of Columbia-
have explicitly embraced this constructive knowledge standard in their mles, 
holding a managing and supervising lawyer responsible for another lawyer's 
misconduct not simply when the supervisor knows of misconduct but also when 
she should knovv of the improper actions. 189 
Rule 5.2, which governs a subordinate's responsibility, supports the notion that 
supervisors should take a more active role in deliberations of close matters. Rule 
5 .2(b) provides: "A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable 
183. Miller, supra note 171, at 276 n.79 (quoting E. REICH, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 153-54 (1987)). 
184. Arthur J. Lachman, What You Should Know Can Hurt You: Management and Supen,isory Responsibil-
ity for the Misconduct of Others under Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3, 18 ABA PROF. LAW. 1 (2007) (discussing cases 
and ABA ethics opinions). 
185. !d. 
186. RESTATEMENT, supra note 172, at § ll, cmt. c. 
187. Richards v. Jain, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 n.4 (W.D.Wa. 2001). 
188. See id. at 1203; Lachman, supra note 184, at l. Constructive knowledge is defined as ["k]nowledge that 
one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, at 888 (4th ed. 2004). Adoption of this more expansive definition of knowledge 
differs from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which defines knowledge as "actual knowledge of the 
fact in question." MODEL RULES R. l.O(f). However, the definition allows that "[a] person's knowledge may be 
inferred from circumstances." MODEL RULES R. l.O(f). 
189. See N.Y. R.P.C. 5.1(d)(2)(ii) (holding supervising or managing lawyer responsible for a lawyer's 
misconduct, if the superior "in the exercise of reasonable management or supervisory authority should have 
lrnown of the conduct."); D.C. R.P.C. 5.l(c)(2) (holding supervising or managing lawyer responsible for a 
lawyer's misconduct if the superior "reasonably should know of the conduct"). 
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resolution of an arguable question of professional duty." 190 In fact, the conunent 
to the Rule suggests, in instances entailing a close question, that it is the 
supervisor who should decide the course of action. 191 The Rule thus encourages 
subordinate lawyers to consult superiors on close questions of law and places the 
onus on the superior to resolve the matter. Where the question is not a close one 
but would clearly constitute a violation of legal ethics,- a subordinate cannot seek 
to excuse his or her conduct by having relied on a superior's order or approval. 192 
Significantly, Rule 5.1 has rarely been enforced, particularly against large law 
firm practices. 193 Professor Ted Schneyer attributes the infrequency of disciplin-
ary proceedings against large law firm lawyers to (1) the difficulty in assigning 
blame to particular individual lawyers because of the nature of collective effort in 
legal work; 194 (2) the reluctance to scapegoat individual lawyers when any 
lawyer in that position might have done the same thing; 195 and (3) the "ethical 
infrastructure" of the firm itself, which "may have at least as much to do with 
causing and avoiding unjustified hann as do the individual values and practice 
skills of their lawyers." 196 
Based in part on these explanations for lax enforcement of regulations 
conceming supervisors' individual responsibility, Schneyer proposed a collective 
finn obligation and responsibility, modeled on the concept of corporate criminal 
responsibility. 197 Corporate liability is premised, in part, upon the idea that if only 
individuals are held liable, "owners will often have no incentive to prevent, 
detect, or remedy such crimes."198 But if the corporation is instead punished and 
its profits diminished, owners will be incentivized to deter the unlawful 
behavior. 199 
A variation of Schneyer's concept of general firm responsibility may be found 
in Professor Irwin Miller's proposal to "expand[] the ethical duty of reasonable 
supervision to the firm, the breach of which constitutes the finn's independent 
violation justifying discipline."200 While sharing the same objective to address a 
firm's responsibility for supervision of lawyers' conduct, this approach may be 
190. MODEL RULES R. 5.2(b). 
191. MoDEL RULES R. 5.2 cmt. 2. 
192. MoDEL RULES R. 5.2(a). The rule removes the possibility of a junior lawyer invoking a "Nuremberg 
defense" in the disciplinary process. 
193. See Schneyer, supra note 101, at I; Lachman, supra note 184, at 1. 
194. Schneyer, supra note 101, at 9. 
195. /d. at 10. 
196. /d. Rostain has suggested that 5.1 (a), the requirement that supervising lawyers "make reasonable efforts 
to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to 
the rules of professional conduct," "is largely unenforceable because it is difficult and likely to be perceived as 
unfair to hold specific individuals responsible for the structural defects of the organization." Rostain, Partners 
and Power, supra note 149, at 282 n.3. 
197. Schneyer, supra note 101, at 12. 
198. !d. at 25. 
199. /d. 
200. Miller, supra note 171, at 305. 
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more palatable given its less expansive reach and the general hostility toward a 
disciplinary rule that would hold a firm or law department vicariously liable for 
lawyers' rnisconduct. 201 Notably, New York and New Jersey are alone among the 
states to adopt this approach in their variations of Rule 5.1, holding firms, not 
simply managing and supervising attorneys, responsible for taking affirmative 
steps to ensure that lawyers in a firm conform to professional rules. 202 
In order to deter misconduct by a firm or law department and its individual 
lawyers, an expanded conception of lawyer responsibility is required. First, the 
firm or law department should be held responsible for supervision. Second, 
managing and supervising lawyers must be held to a constructive knowledge 
standard which imposes liability on them for their subordinates' misconduct if 
they knew, had reason to know, or should have known about the misconduct and 
failed to prevent the misconduct or rectify its effects?03 Such a rule has the great 
advantage of prescribing "the parameters of lawyers' professional relationships 
in their workplaces," regardless of enforcement.204 This sort of rule fosters an 
ethical infrastructure in a firm or law department in which superiors cannot 
ignore or avoid ultimate decisions or render plausible denials of responsibility 
and knowledge of conduct. 205 
V. A SPECIALIZED RULE 5.1 FOR THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 
This Article argues that the dictates of Model Rule 5.1 do not sufficiently 
address supervision of OLC legal opinions. Rather, a new mle governing 
supervision of OLC lawyers should be adopted that includes four key elements: 
( 1) enforceable mles that facilitate compliance with professional mles and 
establish a normative framework for the office, including the duty to provide 
independent advice; (2) structural changes to the OLC, including a two-year 
limitation on the tenure of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the office, 
the creation of an OLC ethics adviser, and a requirement that the Attorney 
General sign particular opinions; (3) a constructive knowledge standard; and 
(4) a broad definition of supervisor, which includes Justice Department compo-
nent chiefs and Executive agency legal advisers, and a requirement that the 
relevant supervisors be consulted for legal advice. In addition, building upon the 
comments to Model Rule 5.1, a supervisor may be obligated to take more 
201. !d. 
202. N.Y. R.P.C. 5.1(a); N.J. R.P.C. 5.1(a). See also N.Y. R.P.C. 5.1(c) (New York also holds law firms 
responsible for properly supervising lawyers). 
203. New York is the only jurisdiction that has adopted both of these elements-the more expansive 
definition of knowledge or duty to know and entity or firm responsibility. See N.Y. R.P.C. 5.1. 
204. Rostain, Partners and Power, supra note 149, at 287. 
205. Lachman, supra note 184, at 6 ("Absent imposition of a constructive knowledge standard under 
subsection (c)(2) of Rules 5.1 and 5.3, supervisors and managers practicing in a firm environment have an 
incentive simply not to 'know."'). 
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significant steps aimed at curbing the misconduct when the matter concerns a 
potential violation of law.206 Also, based upon Model Rule 5.2, when an issue of 
professional judgment about an ethical duty arises in the course of crafting an 
opinion, the supervisor should be responsible for making the judgment. 
Whether the supervising lawyer is within OLC, another Justice Department 
component, or another Executive agency, steps to rectify misconduct must 
include bringing concerns to the attention of officials as high as the Attorney 
General. 207 A duty to rectify misconduct is not mitigated by the fact that the work 
constitutes an OLC Opinion. As a supervising lawyer, whose duties may include 
reviewing and commenting on the opinion, he or she may not be "bound" by the 
opinion. Otherwise the delegation of authority to OLC amounts to an unaccept-
able abdication of responsibility by senior Executive lawyers.208 
The proposed rule seeks to exemplify Judge James E. Baker's description of 
executive process in national security law. As Balcer explains, "[p]rocess 
identifies the official responsible for the decision and for the outcome, as well as 
the criteria to measure effect. Without such legal process, national security 
decision-making might be all speed, secrecy, and silence."209 In contrast to the 
torture memoranda writing process, the proposed rule would ensure a more 
inclusive process that involves a diversity of experts and "critical views and 
facts," and provide more legitimacy to the opinions by requiring that they be 
signed off by politically accountable actors.Z10 
A. RULES ESTABLISHING NORMS AND COMPLIANCE WITH PROFESSIONAL 
RULES AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
The first element of the proposed rule requires that affirmative steps be taken to 
craft a culture of reasonable supervision within the Office. A set of norms must be 
articulated to govern and provide for independent legal advice. Much of the work 
here has been articulated in the OLC Guidelines and Best Practices memoranda, 
though there remain some internal inconsistencies, as discussed above, that 
206. Similarly, OPR considered the nature of the subject in its assessment of Bybee's responsibility, 
observing "this was not a routine project that simply required Bybee to sign off as an administrative matter." 
OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 256-57. The seriousness of the subject-torture-and the extreme legal 
positions-prosecution as an infringement of Presidential power-merit a broader view of responsibility and an 
obligation to correct the misconduct. 
207. The obligation to "report up" the chain of command other government lawyers' misconduct is also 
consistent with, and may be compelled by, MoDEL RULES R. !.13(b) ("Unless the lawyer reasonably believes 
that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher 
authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act 
on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law."). See also MoDEL RULES R. 1.13(b) at cmt. 9 
(noting applicability of MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 to governmental organizations). 
208. See Miller, supra note 171, at 277 n.80 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Finn Culture Sets the Tone on 
Behavior, NAT'LL.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 15, 18). 
209. BAKER, supra note 29, at 24. 
210. !d. at 24-25. 
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should be addressed to make clear that adherence to independence and 
objectivity trumps loyalty to the Executive client. 211 
Second, these rules should be made enforceable, or, at least buttressed, through 
the insertion of a pern1anent ethics advisor within OLC. Lawyers who are 
uncertain about particular assignments, analyses, or other potential misconduct 
may notify the adviser. The adviser would serve as a knowledgeable and 
independent check on OLC lawyers' impulses toward approving Executive 
Branch positions, an approach recommended by psychologists for resisting 
reflexive obedience?12 The adviser would also be authorized to audit OLC legal 
opinions, reviewing completed, but undisclosed memoranda for their legal 
ethical compliance. 
The ethics advisor should be an OLC lawyer, at the Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General level, in order to ensure greater deference to that lawyer's views. Such 
insertion within OLC is necessary because federal regulations provide that OPR's 
findings cannot affect the functions or override the authority of OLC.Z 13 
Cunently, Justice Department employees have a regulation prescribed duty to 
report to their supervisor or to OPR allegations of misconduct by DOJ attorneys, 
which includes legal advice.Z 14 Supervisors may also be required to report the 
misconduct to OPR as well or to a higher ranking official.215 
Third, the Assistant Attorney General may only serve as head of OLC for two 
years. After completion of a two-year term, the President must appoint a new 
chief for the office, requiring Senate confirmation. A transition at the top of the 
office ensures that another powerfully vested set of eyes within one particular 
administration reviews and evaluates the substance and quality of legal opinions 
issued by the office. The example of Jack Goldsmith, as an incoming, 
mid-administration OLC chief, and his withdrawal of particular OLC opinions, 
illustrates the salutary effects of imposing an internal check in the OLC opinion 
process.216 Goldsmith's dispassionate and critical approach to the memoranda 
may be explained, in part, by the fact that he came on board as head of OLC after 
the opinions had been written. This retroactive examination of legal analysis 
ensures that poor legal advice is at least conected, even if after the initial basis for 
the analysis and opinion, limiting, at least, the precedential effect of such 
opinions. In addition, the Senate confirmation process affords an external check 
on the OLC opinion process, facilitating some legislative scrutiny of OLC as 
211. See supra Part II.B; Part liLA. 
212. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 157, at 556 (citing PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MARK R. LIEPE, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 7 5 ( 1991) ). 
213. 28 C.F.R. § 0.129 (2005). 
214. 28 C.F.R. § 45.12 (2006); U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL [Hereinafter USAM], 1-400, Allegations of 
Misconduct by Department of Justice Employees-Reporting Misconduct Allegations. 
215. USAM, supra note 214. 
216. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 141-172 (describing his review of, and decision to withdraw, the Bybee 
Memorandum and Classified Bybee Memorandum). 
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well.217 
Finally, formal opinions determining that laws may not constrain executive 
action or that authorize significant deviations in government policies must be 
signed off on by the Attorney General and not simply by the Assistant Attorney 
General for OLC. This formal allocation of responsibility to the most senior 
Justice Department official recognizes the policy implications of legal opinions; 
decisions of great political consequence must be made by public figures who 
have been vetted by Congress, and who are therefore politically fu!d publicly 
accountable.218 The designation of signing authority may be viewed by some as 
going beyond supervisory responsibility, and holding the Attorney General 
personally responsible because he is now "actively engaged in promoting 
conduct that may violate at least the spirit of existing law,"219 or directing 
changes in government policies. At the very least, the signature requirement 
makes abundantly clear that the Attorney General is ordering or ratifying the 
suspect conduct and should therefore be viewed as a supervisor under any 
iteration of Model Rule 5.1(c)(l). 
B. CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
The constructive knowledge standard is critical to ensuring that OLC's 
ultimately binding and often secret legal opinions are rigorously vetted. As 
discussed above, variants of this standard have already been introduced into the 
New York and District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct.220 The 
similar concept of willful blindness has been recognized in American law in a 
variety of criminal and civil contexts dating back to the late-nineteenth 
century. 221 The constructive knowledge standard also has roots in the doctrine of 
command responsibility, under which superiors may be held responsible for war 
crimes committed by their subordinates.Z22 
217. Another, but less likely politically palatable approach might be to require that OLC heads serve terms 
that are not aligned with a particular administration. Thus the OLC head could, for example, be appointed by the 
President to serve seven or fourteen year terms, similar to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. The 
OLC chief might then be less likely to over identify with the client and be more inclined to say no. For a 
contrasting view, and a generally supportive view of OLC fealty to precedent, see Morrison, supra note 13. 
218. The formal signature requirement will also preclude future Attorneys General from claiming ignorance 
as a defense, a fairly implausible claim that Ashcroft has propounded. See Yoo, supra note 30, at 186-87. 
219. Zacharias, supra note 29, at 360. 
220. See supra Part IV, discussing N.Y. R.P.C. 5.1(d)(2)(ii) and D.C. R.P.C. 5.1(c)(2). 
221. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 U.S.2060, 2068-69 (2011) (holding that the 
doctrine of willful blindness applies in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b)). 
The willful blindness doctrine precludes individuals from evading statutory knowledge or willfulness 
requirements by intentionally keeping from themselves evidence of wrongdoing. !d. 
222. The United States Supreme Court approved the doctrine of command responsibility in In re Yamashita, 
327 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1946), upholding a military tribunal's charges against a Japanese general for breaching his 
duty "to control the operations of the members of his command by 'permitting them to commit' the extensive 
and widespread atrocities specified." Nazi officials were also prosecuted under the doctrine. See, e.g., Case No. 
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Under the proposed rule, superiors shall be prompted to engage in a dialogue 
of greater meaning with the subordinate lawyer because they may be held 
accountable for the opinions. When senior lawyers are provided with draft 
opinions concerning their areas of expertise or specialization, 223 they may be 
viewed as supervisors and their actions should therefore be analyzed under a 
standard that asks what they knew, had reason to know, or should have known 
concerning flaws in the opinion?24 In addition, a supervisor should show the 
opinion to lawyers with relevant expertise, even if outside of OLC. 225 Supervi-
sors must then take steps to correct the flaws and mitigate any consequences of 
the flawed legal reasoning. Supervisors may be sanctioned for the same 
misconduct that their subordinates may be punished for in connection with 
opinions. In addition, they can be sanctioned for failing to properly supervise the 
47: The Hostages Trial: Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, 8 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS 
OF WAR CRIMINALS 34 (1949). More recently, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 codified the doctrine, 
providing: 
Any person is punishable as a principal under this chapter who is a superior commander who, with 
regard to acts punishable under this chapter, knew, had reason to know, or should have known, that a 
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and who failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
§ 950q(3), Title XVill of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub. L. 111-84, 123 
Stat. 2190, enacted October 28, 2009). International treaties have codified the doctrine as well. See Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. 
3217th mtg., at art. 7(3) U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (1993), reprillted in 32 I.L.M. 192, http://www. icty.org/x/file/ 
Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf (holding superior criminally responsible for subordinate's 
violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity "if he knew or had reason to 
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."); Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, at art. 28, U.N. Doc. NConf. 183/9 (1998), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/ 
romefra.htm (providing criminal responsibility for a military commander or person who "(i) either knew or, 
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit 
such crimes; and (ii) ***failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent 
or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution."). For an excellent discussion of command responsibility, see Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. 
Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Emerprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of 
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75, 120-31 (2005). 
223. See infra Part V.C; see also Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1600 (recommending that OLC involve 
relevant government agencies and Department of Justice components in drafting legal opinions); Scharf, supra 
note 120, at 4ll (proposing that OLC seek opinion from State Department Legal Adviser on international law 
matters). 
224. Interestingly, it would appear that OPR, in its assessment of Bybee's responsibility, employed the duty 
to know standard found in the D.C. Professional Rules of Conduct and concluded that he "should have known" 
or "should have questioned and recognized" flaws in Yoo's reasoning. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 256-57. 
Nowhere, however, is Rule 5.1 invoked, and this analysis seems to have been folded into an assessment of 
Bybee's personal responsibility. In contrast, Margolis treated Bybee's role as a supervisor as a mitigating factor 
in his analysis of Bybee's responsibility. Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 100. As noted earlier, see 
supra Part II.C., OPR also determined senior lawyers including Ashcroft and Chertoff, should have known 
about certain errors and should have acted, yet did not address whether they had violated Rule 5.1. 
225. See GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 167 (observing that failure to share opinion with others, in particular 
the State Department, "was done to control outcomes in the opinions and minimize resistance to them"). 
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subordinate lawyer. 
Without a constructive knowledge standard, supervisors of OLC lawyers have 
less motivation to learn of any weaknesses in the opinions, and would, therefore, 
have less reason to correct deficiencies?26 That may well explain what occurred 
with the torture memoranda. As Goldsmith has criticized the manner in which the 
opinions were crafted, Yoo's superiors-Bybee, Ashcroft, and the White 
House-failed to supervise him because they liked the answers and they deferred 
to his purported expertise in internationallaw?27 
A superior, high-level lawyer's desire, or sympathy, for a certain policy or 
programmatic outcome-liking the answers-need not, however, result in 
automatic acceptance of the legal opinion, though the internal and external 
pressures to accede to the reasoning may be great. Goldmsith's legal analysis and 
reevaluation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program after he arrived at OLC, and 
the resulting change of view as to the program's legality by Justice Department 
officials, including Attorney General Ashcroft and Director of the FBI Robert 
Mueller, demonstrate that political appointee lawyers can be swayed by correct 
and independent legal analysis. 228 
The surveillance program was already a signature part of counterterrorism 
efforts when Goldsmith raised questions about the underlying legal bases for the 
program?29 In fact, the program had been renewed on a regular basis by the 
Justice Department, with the Attorney General certifying to its legality?30 Yet 
when Goldsmith questioned the legal opinions supporting the program, an 
official as high as Ashcroft ultimately recognized the flaws in the opinions and 
226. There is, of course, a practical concern that superiors should not have to be involved at every level of 
production of opinions and know every bit of minutiae within them. That is fair; the duty to know need not apply 
to minutiae and marginalia. Presumably, such matters would not be the basis for ethical misconduct charges. 
227. GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 169. Undoubtedly, the role of "groupthink" also explains the lack of any 
significant objections to the torture memoranda. Groupthink is "'a mode of thinking that people engage in when 
they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."' Ronald R. Sims, Linking Groupthink to 
Unethical Behavior in Organizations, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 11:651, 653 (1992) (quoting IRVING L. 
JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (1972)). 
A hallmark of groupthink is an internal pressure to achieve consensus resulting in selective biases that ignore 
countervailing views. MARGARET HEFFERNAN, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: WHY WE IGNORE THE OBVIOUS Kr OUR PERIL 
137 (2011). To be sure the pressure to approve torture and other extreme interrogation techniques was 
significant, and the legitimacy and efficacy of torture unquestioned by many policymakers and high-level 
lawyers at the time of the memoranda's crafting. See, e.g., President Bush Speech, supra note 45; JAMES RISEN, 
STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BusH ADMINISTRATION 22-27 (2006). 
228. GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 177-82; Hearing on U.S. Attomey Firings Before the Senate Judiciary 
Comm., I lOth Cong. (2007) (statement of James B. Corney, Former Dep. Att'y Gen) available at 
http:/ /gulcfac .typepad .corn! georgetown_ university _1 a w I files/ comey. transcript. pdf. 
229. GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 182. 
230. Hearing on U.S. Attorney Firings Before the Senate Judicimy Comm., 11 Oth Con g. (2007) (statement of 
James B. Corney, Former Dep. Att'y Gen) available at http://gulcfac.typepad.corn!georgetown_university_law/ 
files/comey.transcript.pdf. 
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thus the program, and refused to recertify the program.Z31 
This rule seeks to replicate and systemize the incisive legal analysis and 
dialogue undertaken by Goldsmith and Justice Department officials on that 
occasion. The rule requires senior lawyers to probe deep enough so that they may 
be aware of the best, independent legal advice rather than the opinion which 
simply supports the Executive Branch action. 
Requiring sustained and substantive dialogue between superiors and subordi-
nates also addresses the problem of sub silentio communications common to 
many hierarchical organizations.Z32 In many corporate offices, superiors do not 
provide precise instmctions to subordinates, relieving themselves of knowledge, 
permitting them to "declare that a mistake was made."233 Binding opinions on 
matters of the most sensitive nature should not be crafted out of senior Executive 
lawyers' manufactured ignorance or willful blindness. 
While Justice Department officials Ashcroft and Chertoff took part in some 
discussions about the memoranda, their actions were ultimately passive. 234 
Despite apparent misgivings, neither took any corrective action.235 By increasing 
responsibility, they become duty bound to defend the opinions. As studies of 
accountability indicate, the "expectation that [people] will have to justify their 
decision leads people to think more carefully and logically, and not to be satisfied 
with using unarticulated criteria or unsubstantiated empirical judgments to arrive 
at answers. "236 
Under the new rule, senior lawyers would be obligated to discern deficiencies 
and to remonstrate with the author over the flawed analysis, and to either bring 
the errors to a superior's attention or refuse to sign the memoranda. It is precisely 
Ashcroft's and Chertoff's insufficiently engaged and passive role that the 
proposed rule seeks to transform into one of active engagement. Superiors need 
to state explicitly what they want done, direct a set of actions that accords with 
professional rules, and prevent or correct unethical conduct when they know of it 
or should have known of it. 
C. EXPANDED DEFINITION OF SUPERVISOR 
The new mle defines supervisor to include not only the direct supervisor and 
those with managerial responsibility at OLC, i.e., the Assistant Attorney General 
who heads OLC, but also attorneys in other components of the Justice 
Department and the Executive Branch. For example, the Assistant Attorney 
231. Id. 
232. See Rostain, Partners and Power, supra note 149, at 285. 
233. See id. at 285 n.18 (quoting ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAzEs: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 
201 (1988)). . 
234. See supra Part I. C. 
235. See id. 
236. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 157, at 628. 
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General in charge of the Criminal Division, the State Department legal adviser, or 
the Department of Defense General Counsel, who each review OLC opinions 
relating to their areas of expertise, would be considered the opinion authors' 
supervisors as well, and would be held to the same constructive knowledge 
standard as other supervisors. 
An emphasis on supervisory responsibility by its very nature expands the 
universe of concerns beyond just one bad lawyer's self-interest to look at the 
institution, which is represented by the supervisors. The supervisors are asked to 
be regulators themselves, and are not permitted to focus simply on their own 
"self-interest" as the critique goes.237 By clarifying that senior lawyers bear 
supervisory responsibility when they review and comment on the drafting of 
memoranda, these lawyers will be compelled to criticize problems more 
forcefully and take steps to prevent the finalization of problematic advice into a 
formal opinion. 
The expanded definition of supervisor also addresses the "fundamentally 
social character" and "professional culture" of the opinion drafting process, 238 
recognizing that senior lawyers from government offices play significant roles in 
the drafting of OLC memoranda. No OLC opinion is drafted in isolation. 
1. THE APPJHETIC BYSTANDER PROBLEM 
To be clear, the purpose of the proposed rule is not to numerically expand the 
people responsible. Indeed as social scientists have observed, increasing the 
number of people aware of a problem may diffuse responsibility for acting. 239 
For example, the infamous 1964 case of Kitty Genovese, in which a woman was 
repeatedly stabbed and eventually killed in earshot of 38 people, may be seen not 
as an example of the decay of moral values, but as an instance of bystander 
"apathy. "240 
Studies animated in part by that dreadful incident have drawn the conclusion 
that people in groups who are faced with a problem will often assume that 
237. See Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra note 141, at 1302-03. 
238. Jd. at 1337-38. 
239. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 28 (2002); John M. Darley & Bibb Latane, Bystander 
Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 8, 
377-383 (1968), available at http://www.wadsworth.com/psychology _d/templates/student_resources/ 
0155060678_rathus/ps/ps 19 .html. 
240. Darley & Latane, supra note 239, at 377-383; see also Stanley Milgram & Paul Hollander, "The Murder 
They Heard" The Nation, June 15, 1964, Volume 198, No. 25 ("[D]id the witnesses remain passive because they 
thought it was the right thing to do, or did they refrain from action despite what they thought or felt they should 
do? We cannot take it for granted that people always do what they consider right. It would be more fruitful to 
inquire why, in general and in this particular case, there is so marked a discrepancy between values and 
behavior."); BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 157, at 544-45 (drawing conclusion from Genovese case that idleness 
by others leads individuals to think corrective action or intervention is inappropriate). 
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someone else will address the problem or that there is not in fact any problem. 241 
As we also saw in the crafting of the torture memoranda, a number of attorneys 
who were briefed on, or reviewed, the opinions, did not take significant steps to 
rectify the many flaws. This failure to act may be attributed to a dangerous default 
position common to many in the lawyering profession, what Professor Robert K. 
Vischer terms "moral disengagement," "the tendency of lawyers to disclaim any 
responsibility for the moral dimension of the representation. "242 The lack of 
action can further be attributed to the likely awareness that no one else had 
objected strenuously to the contents of the memo. 243 Accordingly, the goal here is 
to ensure that the many social interactions that an opinion's drafting elicits are not 
ones with passive or apathetic bystanders, but instead are meaningful exchanges, 
in which those who are supervisors understand that they are in fact responsible 
and act based upon a set of ethical values. In short, they own the memoranda too; 
they are responsible for their subordinates' work product. 
In the OLC context, concerns over bystander apathy are more pronounced 
because of OLC's role as expositor of Executive law. Senior lawyers advising on 
draft OLC opinions cannot assume a passive or apathetic role in the face of 
misconduct. And yet it appears this is precisely the deferential relationship OPR 
approved in its report in its exoneration of Ashcroft, Chertoff, and others.244 
2. PUBLIC LEGAL OFFICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Expanding supervisory responsibility to include politically appointed lawyers 
who require Senate confirmation increases the likelihood that the underlying 
norms and culture of OLC will be clarified?45 Holding political appointees 
accountable, who may be public figures, makes it more politically difficult for 
these lawyers to invoke a purely instrumentalist defense of simply serving the 
241. Gladwell, supra note 239, at 28; Darley & Latane, supra note 239, at 377-83; BREST & KruEGER, supra 
note 157, at 539-49 (discussing literature on social conformity). 
242. Robert K. Vischer, Professionalizing Moral Engagement (A Response to Michael Hatfield), l04 Nw. 
U. L. REv. CoLLOQUY 33 (2009). 
243. The failure to object in the workplace is not unique to the legal profession. Employees, even at 
executive levels, rarely raise problems that they perceive in an organization with their superiors. See 
HEFFERNAN, supra note 227, at 93-94 (citing Frances J. Milliken & Elizabeth W. Morrison, et al.; An 
Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don't Communicate Upward and Why, JOURNAL 
OF MANAGEMENT STUD!ES 40(6): 1453-1476 (2003) (finding that 85 percent of executives reported instances of 
being unable to raise issue or concerns with their bosses). See also Sims, supra note 227, at 652 (discussing 
Onyx Corporation case study and the employees' failure to express reservations). 
244. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 259. 
245. Professor Cassandra Burke Robertson raises questions over whether lawyers involved as policymakers 
can ever provide independent legal advice. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 
42 CONN. L. REv. 1, 25-27 (2009). Robertson suggests that it was Yoo's policy role that helps explain his 
aggressive opinions in the service of the Executive client. I d. In contrast, Goldsmith, who was not involved in 
policies, could view the memo from a dispassionate stance, and ultimately decide to withdraw the Bybee Memo. 
I d. 
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client and making a purely defensible legal analysis. Indeed, the public is far less 
likely than the professional bar to stomach professional role obligations as a basis 
for suspect legal analysis. By making it difficult for high level attorneys to simply 
hide behind legal analyses of subordinates, it requires that legal opinions be 
informed by a normative foundation reflecting moral values, rather than simply 
anchoring them in the ethic of zealous client advocacy. 246 
High level government lawyers might be expected to adhere to what Spaulding 
terms an "ethic of professional independence."247 It is not unreasonable to expect 
that lawyers, who have been approved by Congress, and are therefore, in some 
sense more accountable, be more predisposed to "embody the attributes of 
responsibility (proportionality, detachment, sensitivity to social consequences, 
etc.) even when they see themselves as internally animated by the same ultimate 
ends held by the politicians they serve."248 A more expansive definition of 
supervisor requires that senior legal officials be held responsible for maintaining 
an appropriate balance of these tensions. 
Indeed, it is desirable that decisions of such magnitude as whether interroga-
tion techniques constitute torture be made by lawyers at senior levels who are 
more accountable to the public by virtue of their public profile and political 
appointment?49 These unique lawyers who straddle the intersection of law and 
policy (and lawmalcing and policymaking) should be expected to engage in "a 
moral dialogue" within the Executive Branch as they craft and oversee legal 
opinions of great import.250 The proposed rule ensures their participation and 
ultimate accountability. 
This latter benefit of a more expansive and rigorous formulation of reasonable 
supervision would obviate the critique of the OPR report (and, by extension, the 
246. Increasing the number of lawyers involved in an opinion whose roles and responsibility are carefully 
delineated may also improve the quality of the opinion. Researchers have found that the measurable collective 
intelligence of groups can exceed that of the groups' individual members' intelligence. See Anita Williams 
Woolley, et al., Evidence for a Collective Intelligence Factor in the Peifonnance of Human Groups, SCIENCE 
330, 686, 687 (2010), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/330/6004/686.full.pdf?keytype= 
ref&siteid=sci&ijkey=i18Ab9gV6Wr9o. Furthermore, "groups where a few people dominated the conversa-
tion were less collectively intelligent than those with a more equal distribution of conversational tum-taking." 
/d. at 688. Thus, rather than allow any one OLC lawyer to dominate in writing the opinion, the opinion should be 
vetted by a group of lawyers with equal say on the content of the opinion to ensure the highest caliber opinion. 
247. Spaulding, supra note 22, at 1952. 
248. /d. at 1952; see also BAKER, supra note 29, at 25 ("In a constitutional democracy, who makes the 
decision can be as important as the substance of the decision .... Where the capacity to decide is discretionary, 
good process guides decisions to appropriate actors, who are accountable and who may invoke electoral or 
appointive legitimacy and credibility."); BEST & KruEGER, supra note 157, at 627-29 (discussing approaches to 
improving decision making and accountability). 
249. See Zacharias, supra note 29, at 346; BAKER, supra note 29, at 25. 
250. Vischer contends that it is "[e]specially in cases where the governing law is indeterminate," such as 
those the OLC often confronts, "lawyers need to be able to engage their clients in a moral dialogue, which 
requires both familiarity with, and sensitivity to, moral reasoning." Vischer, supra note 242, at 37-38. Higher 
level accountability makes that engagement more likely as senior lawyers are more likely to have the temerity 
and gravitas to confront and oppose other senior policymakers. 
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over-individualized nature of external regulation of lawyers in general)-that it 
addressed only the manner, and not the result, of the torture memoranda. By 
holding more lawyers responsible for ensuring that memoranda are thoroughly 
and independently crafted, a more substantive discourse between lawyers and 
policymakers will occur. At the very least, it should elicit a debate, perhaps a 
public one, over whether "aggressive, but defensible" is both an acceptable basis 
for policy and lens through which to assess legal reasoning for the Executive. 
D. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED RULE-CASE STUDIES 
Had the proposed rule been in place at the time of the drafting of the Bybee 
Memorandum, a broader group of supervisors would have been held responsible 
for the Memorandum's errors. These individuals had reason to know, or should 
have known, of the opinion's flaws, but failed to correct them, and also failed to 
mitigate their consequences. 
1. MICHAEL CHERTOFF 
In his review of the Bybee Memo, Assistant Attorney General and chief of the 
Criminal Division Michael Chertoff did not make substantial efforts to prevent 
the inclusion of the Specific Intent or Commander-in-Chief sections. To whatever 
extent he expressed disagreement with the analysis, Chertoff apparently commu-
nicated his concerns only to Yoo. 251 If he felt that this should not have been a 
binding legal opinion that would support interrogation techniques and potentially 
function as an effective declination to prosecute, he did not take sufficient steps to 
prevent the signing. It is not clear whether OPR considered Chertoff's responsi-
bility under Rule 5.1. Arguably, Chertoff was not Yoo's supervisor or managing 
attorney because of his position within the Criminal Division, a division distinct 
from the OLC. However, under the proposed rule, Chertoff would have to. be 
considered a supervisor given his hierarchical position and, more importantly, the 
role that he took in advising Yoo. Chertoff was sought out for his legal advice 
because of his authority as the head of the Criminal Division and his expertise. 
His role should be seen as similar to that of a partner who specializes in criminal 
litigation brought in to advise on the criminal ramifications of a transaction 
structured by the merger and acquisitions group. He cannot abdicate responsibil-
ity to supervise that work, particularly as it relates to his area of advice. 
As a supervisor under the new rule Chertoff should have known that the 
weaknesses in the Bybee Memo lacked independence and constituted profes-
sional misconduct. He should have scrutinized the drafts at a greater level than he 
apparently did. And, where the memoranda veered from the rules' requirements 
of objectivity and candor, for example, he should have taken steps to edit them 
251. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 59. 
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accordingly, or prevented the signing of the memoranda. The national security 
and human rights implications of the subject of the Memo would also argue for 
action to be taken by Chertoff. Given the sensitive subject matter, it is hardly too 
taxing to require a high level lawyer to review closely the Memo and to be held 
accountable for failing to reasonably supervise its crafting. 
In addition, Model Rule 5.2 provides that it would have been Chertoff, as the 
head of the Criminal Division, who should have been responsible for the advice 
in the memo concerning criminal matters. As a lawyer with little to no criminal 
experience, Yoo sought Chertoff's opinion on specific intent. Assuming this was 
a close question, it was Chertoff's responsibility to advise against adoption of the 
cramped interpretations, not Yoo's. 
As for the Commander-in-Chief section, Chertoff was well aware that the CIA 
had sought an advance pardon for instances in which the CIA violated the torture 
statute. In fact, it was Chertoff who had refused as head of the Criminal Division 
to issue an advance pardon, yet here he was in effect acquiescing in an opinion 
that would be utilized to defend against charges of torture. Indeed Chertoff 
delivered a somewhat opaque comment, "I'm not in a position to sign onto 
this."252 Taken either as refusal to sign off on the view or a denial of 
responsibility (i.e., "it is not my place to sign this"), Chertoff did not take 
sufficient action to prevent these sections from being inserted as it does not 
appear he communicated this to anyone besides Yoo. Under the new rule it would 
be abundantly clear that Chertoff would be expected to know and to act by virtue 
of his stature, expertise, and involvement in the opinion drafting process, as well 
as the significance of the issue. He would be expected to bring any concerns to the 
attention of the Attorney General and even to the President. 
2. JOHN ASHCROFT 
John Ashcroft would also have failed to reasonably supervise Yoo and Bybee 
under the proposed rule. 253 According to the OPR Report, it would appear that 
Ashcroft never read the Bybee Memo.254 However, Ashcroft was briefed on the 
contents of the opinion. Under the Model Rule one could plausibly contend that 
Ashcroft lacked actual knowledge of the weaknesses in the opinion because he 
never read the Bybee Memo. Under the proposed rule, however, the inquiry is 
whether Ashcroft had reason to know or should have known of the weaknesses. 
Failing to read the memorandum is no defense; he should have read the opinion, 
252. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 59. 
253. See Power, supra note 13, at 89-97 (discussing Ashcroft's responsibility under Rule 5.!). Recall also 
that Condoleezza Rice claims she told Ashcroft "personally to review and confirm" the drafts. See also S. 
Armed Services Comm., Inquiry, supra note 88, at 35. 
254. Under the proposed rule, the import of the Bybee Memorandum, particularly its determination that the 
torture statute could not limit Executive action, would have necessitated the Attorney General's signature. See 
Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 31. 
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and he should have probed more deeply. His role as supervisor would be even 
more pronounced given that he did in fact read the Classified Bybee Memo and 
authorized the interrogation techniques. One critical purpose of the proposed rule 
is to encourage meaningful participation by superiors in the most critical legal 
matters. On such an important matter, Ashcroft should have read the Bybee 
Memorandum particularly where he would authorize the techniques. He would 
then be deemed to have constructive knowledge of the flaws in the underlying 
analysis. To the extent Ashcroft might seek to justify his authorization based upon 
the view that the analysis was "aggressive, but defensible," any ethics inquiry 
would necessarily address this explanation, thereby engaging in a discourse on 
the norms governing Executive law and lawyers. 
E. OBJECTIONS 
One concern posed by the suggested rule is that it would dilute the authority of 
OLC opinions by recognizing lawyers outside of OLC as supervisors and 
requiring that they correct analyses drafted by OLC lawyers.255 The intent of the 
proposed rule is not to diminish the weight of OLC opinions; rather, the objective 
is to ensure that drafts of the opinion are not regarded as unassailable, and 
thereby encourage meaningful criticisms on drafts by supervisors to ensure that 
the ultimate and binding memo is correct. 256 This rule recognizes yet another 
structural limitation of OLC-not all matters can be addressed by a small office 
of twenty-five attorneys in secret; nor should they be. 
A second related concern raised by the proposed rule is that in opening up the 
heretofore relatively isolated OLC lawyers to the supervision of other offices' 
lawyers, their objectivity and neutrality would be threatened.257 There is perhaps 
potential for this, but it also sheds light on the fantasy that twenty-five lawyers 
can or should make the law in isolation. Indeed, as described above, it may be 
255. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 13, at 1462. Morrison contends that OLC's advice carries more weight 
than other agencies' legal opinions precisely because the latter-notwithstanding their expertise-are "in-house 
legal staff," with a greater self-interest in appeasing the agency client, whereas OLC is external to any agency, 
and thus has less pressure to ingratiate itself with the client.ld. at 1461-63, 1465. 
256. The Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel reflect the same ameliorative objective to ensure 
greater accuracy by recommending OLC's solicitation of relevant agencies' expertise. Guidelines, supra note 4, 
at 1609 ("The involvement of affected entities serves as an additional check against erroneous reasoning by 
ensuring that all views and relevant information are considered. Administrative coordination allows OLC to 
avail itself of the substantive expertise of the various components of the executive branch and to avoid 
overlooking potentially important consequences before rendering advice."). Obtaining alternative views helps 
address the potentially homogenous views of OLC lawyers, which can foster the willful blindness of an 
institution. See HEFFERNAN, supra note 227, at 233. 
257. As with the first objection, OLC's authority is predicated upon its purported independence due to the 
fact that it is not aligned with an Executive agency; it is not "in-house" counsel for any one agency. Morrison, 
supra note 13. at 1461-63. Of course, OLC may be viewed as "in-house" counsel for the President, which 
presents tremendous countervailing pressures on its independence and objectivity, as is discussed throughout 
this Article. 
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unrealistic to think that OLC ever was, or ever will be, walled off from the 
influences of lawyers of other agencies. Certainly Yoo was influenced by, or at 
least not removed from, the views of the CIA counsel and advocates of aggressive 
interrogation techniques in the White House. Defining supervisor to include 
senior lawyers from other agencies and Justice Department components who 
must review or comment on the draft opinions recognizes the inherently social 
and collective nature of the legal process?58 The requirement that views outside 
of OLC be considered ensures a modicum of diversity and dissent that may 
temper the risk of groupthink.259 Entrusting additional legal officials with greater 
responsibility also places another potential check against undue influence from 
the Executive client, particularly when it is the President. 
A third objection to the proposed rule is that it is predicated upon the conceit 
that the crafting of the memoranda reflects a normative void and was solely the 
product of client-centered advocacy, untethered to rule of law concems?60 
Instead, however, the opinions might be better viewed as the outgrowth of what 
OLC lawyers and their superiors considered "an appropriate new legal frame-
work," aggressively focused on modem terrorism?61 These lawyers were not 
then acting without conscience, as Luban has suggested. To the contrary, 
Spaulding argues, "they acted as moral activists or 'cause lawyers,' seeking to 
vindicate, not disregard, their own strongly held moral, political, and legal 
views."262 To the extent Spaulding's observation is correct, and I think there is 
much merit to it, what corrective or alternative norm might be expected to be 
generated out of a compelled discourse of superiors? 
While it is true that many in the Bush Administration, including senior 
lawyers, believed ardently in the need for a "New Normal" in confronting 
twenty-first century terrbrism/63 I contend that compelling greater supervisory 
responsibility for the supporting secret legal analyses by lower level lawyers 
would have ensured modulation of the opinions. John Yoo may well have 
258. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1609. 
259. See Sims, supra note 227, at 660-61 (discussing approaches that organizations should employ to reduce 
the likelihood of groupthink). 
260. See, e.g., Spaulding, supra note 22, at 1974-1975 (contending "a more complex set of sources" explains 
OLC's "professional failure"). 
261. /d. at 1976; see also id. at 1975-76 (characterizing problem as "an excess ofpurposivism, not an excess 
of narrowly client-centered lawyering"). 
262. /d. at 1975; see also Vischer, supra note 242, at 33 ("There is no reason to believe, however, that Yoo's 
moral intuition would have led him to reject the conclusions set forth in the memos, and there is some evidence 
that his moral intuition helped shape his analysis."). 
263. See, e.g., Ben Fenton, Cheney Retums With Waming on 'New Way of Life, 'THE TELEGRAPH, October 27, 
2001; Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, White House General Counsel to President George W. Bush, Re: 
Decision ReApplication of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with AI Qaeda and the 
Taliban, 2 (January 25, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/gnzls 12502mem2 
gwb2.html ("[T]he war against terrorism is a new kind of war .... In my judgment, this new paradigm renders 
obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its 
provisions ... "). 
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sincerely believed in the President's wartime authority to override congressional 
enactments, but it is another matter to expect the Attorney General and other 
senior Executive lawyers to all have been prepared to "sign onto" that extreme 
legal framework. Nor should it be acceptable to cede this legal authority to a 
politically unaccountable lawyer such as Yoo. 
Delineating clearly the roles of supervisors and their attendant duties to 
establish standards of ethical conduct and independence, but also their duties to 
know of, and to rectify, misconduct, ensure that politically accountable senior 
lawyers understand in greater detail the legal bases that purport to support any 
new normative foundation. As the Terrorist Surveillance Program incident 
illustrated, partisan senior lawyers can be dissuaded from a policy decision when 
it is demonstrated that the legal analysis undergirding that policy is suspect. 
Holding senior lawyers responsible as supervisors under a constructive 
knowledge standard forces senior lawyers to determine whether an "aggressive, 
but defensible" standard is the appropriate norm by which to measure OLC 
opinions. Their own moral judgments may come into play, as Luban would 
encourage, and as may be appropriate given their roles in often deciding mixed 
questions of law and policy. Senior Executive lawyers cannot adopt an apathetic 
bystander position or push down OLC opinions. The memoranda do not serve as 
mere functionary components of a bureaucracy but rather are the effective law of 
the Executive. Accordingly, senior Executive lawyers must regard the memo-
randa in their capacities as regulators of subordinate lawyers, and as publicly 
accountable lawmakers, with a primary "obligation to see that justice is done. "264 
CONCLUSION 
In the post-9111 landscape, the Executive will continue to seek greater 
authority and power, often in secret, in the name of national security. With 
infrequent external checks and balances from the other branches of government, 
an effective, internal executive process is critical to guaranteeing the legality of 
Executive actions. The OLC torture memoranda demonstrate that the process is 
deficient. These opinions, and the aftermath of proposed OLC reforms and ethics 
investigations, evidence too great a concern for the prerogatives and authority of 
the Executive, particularly during crisis periods, at the expense of the best, 
independent legal advice. Holding senior lawyers accountable for the work of 
their OLC subordinates is critical to ensuring that opinions are of the finest and 
most independent quality. 
A precisely defined executive process is necessary to ensure that the Executive 
is provided independent legal advice rather than relying solely upon amorphous 
OLC cultural norms and professional integrity. However, a limited focus on 
264. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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professional misconduct by the individual OLC lawyers who draft the opinions is 
insufficient. By requiring a two-year rotation of OLC chiefs, installing an ethics 
adviser within OLC, and requiring the Attorney General's signature on novel 
opinions, the proposed rule would establish a process better suited to providing 
independent advice. These structural changes would better insulate legal 
opinions from the tendency to automatically approve Executive positions and 
would delineate greater authority and responsibility to more accountable actors. 
In addition, the new rule would make clear the obligation to provide independent 
legal advice and widen the zone of responsibility for OLC subordinates' 
opinions, holding senior lawyers responsible for unethical conduct when they 
had reason to know, or should have known, of the deficiencies, and failed to 
correct the errors or rectify the consequences. The proposed rule and process 
make clear that OLC cannot write a blank check for the Executive Branch. 
